

Christopher Sharp

Katie Howland

2022 ODNI UAP Report & Sean Kirkpatrick Slideshow



**DISCLOSURE
TEAM**

1
00:00:09,790 --> 00:00:05,820
foreign

2
00:00:12,830 --> 00:00:09,800
[Music]

3
00:00:15,709 --> 00:00:12,840
they were complex narratives of being

4
00:00:19,689 --> 00:00:15,719
taken by alien beings into UFOs on beams

5
00:00:30,349 --> 00:00:22,490
the Air Force is trying to cover up with

6
00:00:35,270 --> 00:00:32,749
from my own point of view I'm going to

7
00:00:37,010 --> 00:00:35,280
be very disappointed if UFOs turn out to

8
00:00:38,330 --> 00:00:37,020
be nothing more than visit us from

9
00:00:41,930 --> 00:00:38,340
another planet because I think there

10
00:00:41,940 --> 00:00:45,050
foreign

11
00:01:08,330 --> 00:01:04,609
[Music]

12
00:01:09,289 --> 00:01:08,340
hello everybody and welcome back to the

13
00:01:12,109 --> 00:01:09,299

channel

14

00:01:14,870 --> 00:01:12,119

it has been a crazy few days for the UFO

15

00:01:16,789 --> 00:01:14,880

subject with the report dropping and you

16

00:01:18,109 --> 00:01:16,799

know it's been talked about on all the

17

00:01:20,090 --> 00:01:18,119

other channels so I feel like I'm

18

00:01:21,649 --> 00:01:20,100

playing catch up to those guys but you

19

00:01:24,050 --> 00:01:21,659

know I did want to come on and cover it

20

00:01:27,530 --> 00:01:24,060

and I've brought two awesome guests with

21

00:01:29,390 --> 00:01:27,540

me who I'll bring on in one second uh

22

00:01:31,730 --> 00:01:29,400

just the usual house rules if you could

23

00:01:33,469 --> 00:01:31,740

keep the chat nice and cool calm and

24

00:01:35,569 --> 00:01:33,479

collected I would really appreciate that

25

00:01:38,630 --> 00:01:35,579

it's okay to have differences of opinion

26

00:01:40,730 --> 00:01:38,640

we all kind of uh take different things

27

00:01:43,670 --> 00:01:40,740

from this report if anything at all

28

00:01:45,649 --> 00:01:43,680

because it wasn't exactly uh brimming

29

00:01:47,210 --> 00:01:45,659

with information but we'll we'll try and

30

00:01:49,069 --> 00:01:47,220

break it down as best we can from our

31

00:01:51,590 --> 00:01:49,079

different perspectives

32

00:01:53,450 --> 00:01:51,600

um I also have an exclusive quote from

33

00:01:55,069 --> 00:01:53,460

luellizondo I was lucky enough to have a

34

00:01:57,469 --> 00:01:55,079

chat with Lou about three hours ago

35

00:01:59,090 --> 00:01:57,479

about the report so lose provided me

36

00:02:01,069 --> 00:01:59,100

with a short statement which is always

37

00:02:01,789 --> 00:02:01,079

interesting to to hear that point of

38

00:02:04,249 --> 00:02:01,799

view

39

00:02:05,929 --> 00:02:04,259

so yeah any questions that you guys have

40

00:02:07,190 --> 00:02:05,939

throughout please pop them in capital

41

00:02:09,050 --> 00:02:07,200

letters

42

00:02:10,910 --> 00:02:09,060

um yeah and they'll we'll try and get to

43

00:02:12,650 --> 00:02:10,920

them at some point if they're relevant

44

00:02:14,869 --> 00:02:12,660

to that particular moment I will try my

45

00:02:17,150 --> 00:02:14,879

best to read them there and then if not

46

00:02:19,309 --> 00:02:17,160

we'll get to them towards the end of the

47

00:02:21,290 --> 00:02:19,319

discussion so let's start this off by

48

00:02:23,869 --> 00:02:21,300

bringing in my guests so first up I'd

49

00:02:25,729 --> 00:02:23,879

like to welcome Katie Howland Katie how

50

00:02:27,410 --> 00:02:25,739

are you doing you're doing great thanks

51
00:02:29,690 --> 00:02:27,420
for having me Vinnie it's my pleasure

52
00:02:31,790 --> 00:02:29,700
thank you so much I always value your

53
00:02:33,589 --> 00:02:31,800
your input when we're talking about this

54
00:02:35,270 --> 00:02:33,599
aspect of the phenomena and others of

55
00:02:38,270 --> 00:02:35,280
course but yeah I really do appreciate

56
00:02:40,430 --> 00:02:38,280
you being here uh and next up uh we have

57
00:02:43,130 --> 00:02:40,440
my good friend Mr Christopher sharp

58
00:02:46,070 --> 00:02:43,140
Chris welcome back hey brother such

59
00:02:48,290 --> 00:02:46,080
Delight being here with you and Katie I

60
00:02:50,570 --> 00:02:48,300
admire you both so much not only is just

61
00:02:51,949 --> 00:02:50,580
like people who are so well versed in

62
00:02:54,350 --> 00:02:51,959
this topic but it's just fantastic

63
00:02:56,270 --> 00:02:54,360

friends and human beings really so thank

64

00:02:57,589 --> 00:02:56,280

you thank you so much so that's really

65

00:02:59,210 --> 00:02:57,599

kind of you to say

66

00:03:00,949 --> 00:02:59,220

um and yeah it wasn't that long ago you

67

00:03:03,949 --> 00:03:00,959

were here discussing the discussing the

68

00:03:06,470 --> 00:03:03,959

ndaa so it's nice to have you back to to

69

00:03:07,970 --> 00:03:06,480

kind of go over this report and uh Katie

70

00:03:09,770 --> 00:03:07,980

with your experience on the hill and

71

00:03:11,330 --> 00:03:09,780

things like that I think it really is uh

72

00:03:13,970 --> 00:03:11,340

really informative having you here to

73

00:03:16,190 --> 00:03:13,980

kind of weigh in on what we can kind of

74

00:03:18,890 --> 00:03:16,200

pull out of this report

75

00:03:20,449 --> 00:03:18,900

um so yeah I guess we should just jump

76

00:03:22,369 --> 00:03:20,459

into it we'll kind of go through it we

77

00:03:24,050 --> 00:03:22,379

won't read it word for word so if I do

78

00:03:26,930 --> 00:03:24,060

scroll past anything that you think was

79

00:03:29,690 --> 00:03:26,940

important please let me know and yeah

80

00:03:31,610 --> 00:03:29,700

let's let's get to it it was quite I

81

00:03:33,229 --> 00:03:31,620

remember when I first opened the page

82

00:03:35,030 --> 00:03:33,239

and refreshed it and it was there I was

83

00:03:38,149 --> 00:03:35,040

just like oh here we go

84

00:03:39,830 --> 00:03:38,159

so uh yeah let's get into it

85

00:03:42,350 --> 00:03:39,840

so obviously we have the table of

86

00:03:44,449 --> 00:03:42,360

contents let's skip that the executive

87

00:03:47,330 --> 00:03:44,459

summary I mean

88

00:03:48,890 --> 00:03:47,340

it kind of to me it was great to see

89

00:03:50,509 --> 00:03:48,900

that the number of cases had jumped up

90

00:03:52,970 --> 00:03:50,519

to 510

91

00:03:55,850 --> 00:03:52,980

I mean my initial thoughts were it I'd

92

00:03:58,250 --> 00:03:55,860

imagine that the the reporting processes

93

00:03:59,449 --> 00:03:58,260

have given us these uh new numbers

94

00:04:01,130 --> 00:03:59,459

because

95

00:04:02,869 --> 00:04:01,140

am I do you think I'm right in saying

96

00:04:05,809 --> 00:04:02,879

that the stigma is slightly starting to

97

00:04:08,750 --> 00:04:05,819

drop with regards to aviators and

98

00:04:11,089 --> 00:04:08,760

military personnel coming forward

99

00:04:13,729 --> 00:04:11,099

you go first Katie

100

00:04:15,830 --> 00:04:13,739

I mean I think it obviously is

101
00:04:16,909 --> 00:04:15,840
it has been such an increase in

102
00:04:18,830 --> 00:04:16,919
the world and I think we have to realize

103
00:04:21,289 --> 00:04:18,840
that

104
00:04:23,030 --> 00:04:21,299
relatively short amount of time I mean

105
00:04:25,010 --> 00:04:23,040
it's one thing for us who are constantly

106
00:04:27,230 --> 00:04:25,020
looking at this to go oh only a couple

107
00:04:30,350 --> 00:04:27,240
hundred more you know um but that's

108
00:04:33,170 --> 00:04:30,360
that's huge in a short amount of time

109
00:04:36,050 --> 00:04:33,180
um I also think that you know we're

110
00:04:39,230 --> 00:04:36,060
going to see a rapid increase just as

111
00:04:41,450 --> 00:04:39,240
public education on the topic

112
00:04:43,969 --> 00:04:41,460
um happens because I think a lot of

113
00:04:46,189 --> 00:04:43,979

folks are just used to the status quo of

114

00:04:47,990 --> 00:04:46,199
not reporting not talking about it

115

00:04:49,670 --> 00:04:48,000
um but as it's more in the news we've

116

00:04:50,810 --> 00:04:49,680
seen a lot of media coverage lately I

117

00:04:52,430 --> 00:04:50,820
think we're going to see those numbers

118

00:04:54,050 --> 00:04:52,440
Skyrocket

119

00:04:56,150 --> 00:04:54,060
um I'm an epidemiologist by background

120

00:04:58,189 --> 00:04:56,160
and one of the first things they teach

121

00:04:59,990 --> 00:04:58,199
you is just because you see an increase

122

00:05:02,870 --> 00:05:00,000
in reports doesn't mean there's an

123

00:05:04,790 --> 00:05:02,880
increase in the actual sightings right A

124

00:05:07,249 --> 00:05:04,800
lot of times better identification

125

00:05:08,870 --> 00:05:07,259
better definition

126

00:05:11,090 --> 00:05:08,880

um less stigma and I think that's

127

00:05:13,129 --> 00:05:11,100

definitely what we're seeing here

128

00:05:15,650 --> 00:05:13,139

yeah Chris what do you think

129

00:05:18,110 --> 00:05:15,660

yes yes Stephanie um it's going away

130

00:05:20,570 --> 00:05:18,120

what they're trying to focus on now is

131

00:05:23,870 --> 00:05:20,580

submariners which is something which is

132

00:05:26,810 --> 00:05:23,880

made clear in the round table discussion

133

00:05:28,550 --> 00:05:26,820

we had with Moultrie and Kirkpatrick and

134

00:05:30,710 --> 00:05:28,560

that's a really big thing in terms of

135

00:05:33,590 --> 00:05:30,720

the um the definition and identified

136

00:05:34,790 --> 00:05:33,600

anomalous uh phenomena um so it doesn't

137

00:05:37,010 --> 00:05:34,800

have that

138

00:05:39,110 --> 00:05:37,020

um aerial connotation anymore so that's

139

00:05:40,909 --> 00:05:39,120

really what they're keen on now is

140

00:05:43,490 --> 00:05:40,919

breaking through that Dam which is the

141

00:05:45,409 --> 00:05:43,500

submariners yeah and do you think it's

142

00:05:48,950 --> 00:05:45,419

important to clarify that this is this

143

00:05:50,650 --> 00:05:48,960

was mandated by Congress for the fiscal

144

00:05:54,050 --> 00:05:50,660

year 2022

145

00:05:56,029 --> 00:05:54,060

ndaa so we have seen new language you

146

00:05:58,610 --> 00:05:56,039

know sign into law back around Christmas

147

00:06:02,150 --> 00:05:58,620

time but that's not relevant to this as

148

00:06:05,510 --> 00:06:02,160

such am I right in sort of saying that

149

00:06:09,350 --> 00:06:05,520

I mean I think what you saw in the 2023

150

00:06:11,330 --> 00:06:09,360

ndaa was less focused on

151
00:06:14,090 --> 00:06:11,340
um definitions right other than the

152
00:06:16,670 --> 00:06:14,100
terminology terminology shift from to an

153
00:06:18,350 --> 00:06:16,680
unidentified anomalous phenomena so I

154
00:06:20,210 --> 00:06:18,360
don't think that's going to affect the

155
00:06:21,590 --> 00:06:20,220
number of reports

156
00:06:22,850 --> 00:06:21,600
um that are going to affect the

157
00:06:25,010 --> 00:06:22,860
Whistleblower

158
00:06:27,350 --> 00:06:25,020
um side of things and the industry

159
00:06:30,469 --> 00:06:27,360
reports of ndas and that kind of thing

160
00:06:32,090 --> 00:06:30,479
so I wouldn't expect this year's ndaa to

161
00:06:34,189 --> 00:06:32,100
dramatically

162
00:06:38,990 --> 00:06:34,199
um affect the number of reports we're

163
00:06:44,210 --> 00:06:41,629

and did anyone I mean it was interesting

164

00:06:46,730 --> 00:06:44,220

to see Nim Aviation for me personally

165

00:06:48,650 --> 00:06:46,740

when that when I saw that in that page I

166

00:06:51,650 --> 00:06:48,660

was like okay because you know we we saw

167

00:06:55,189 --> 00:06:51,660

that debacle with the logo uh last year

168

00:06:58,370 --> 00:06:55,199

like any thoughts on that at all

169

00:07:00,830 --> 00:06:58,380

right go for it

170

00:07:01,969 --> 00:07:00,840

um yeah that's very very interesting

171

00:07:03,830 --> 00:07:01,979

that is

172

00:07:05,390 --> 00:07:03,840

um I mean

173

00:07:08,150 --> 00:07:05,400

um I don't know how much I can really

174

00:07:10,790 --> 00:07:08,160

say about this but um yeah sorry it's a

175

00:07:12,469 --> 00:07:10,800

journalist problem but um yeah I think

176

00:07:15,290 --> 00:07:12,479

they've played a really big part of the

177

00:07:16,790 --> 00:07:15,300

report let's say but um I'd try to point

178

00:07:19,070 --> 00:07:16,800

out that I was just looking at it over

179

00:07:20,029 --> 00:07:19,080

again I can't see the doe in there

180

00:07:22,969 --> 00:07:20,039

anywhere

181

00:07:25,850 --> 00:07:22,979

so the report was to actually

182

00:07:29,870 --> 00:07:25,860

look into kind of like incidents

183

00:07:34,070 --> 00:07:29,880

relating to nuclear assets as well

184

00:07:34,969 --> 00:07:34,080

um which was within the ndaa 2022

185

00:07:38,089 --> 00:07:34,979

um

186

00:07:40,870 --> 00:07:38,099

so that that's really interesting so was

187

00:07:43,249 --> 00:07:40,880

that the doe not

188

00:07:44,749 --> 00:07:43,259

cooperating to some extent I mean that'd

189

00:07:46,370 --> 00:07:44,759

be interesting to find out well I think

190

00:07:48,170 --> 00:07:46,380

you meant you may have mentioned before

191

00:07:50,930 --> 00:07:48,180

Katie that

192

00:07:53,150 --> 00:07:50,940

um maybe it's just the case that this

193

00:07:53,870 --> 00:07:53,160

information is so sensitive it may have

194

00:07:56,089 --> 00:07:53,880

not

195

00:07:58,430 --> 00:07:56,099

been within the unclassified version

196

00:08:00,170 --> 00:07:58,440

regardless but um yeah that's an

197

00:08:02,330 --> 00:08:00,180

interesting question to ponder

198

00:08:03,770 --> 00:08:02,340

yeah I think we're talking about I think

199

00:08:06,230 --> 00:08:03,780

what in the admin

200

00:08:08,870 --> 00:08:06,240

AR sections I think it's like mno

201
00:08:12,110 --> 00:08:08,880
perhaps that have to do with nuclear

202
00:08:14,629 --> 00:08:12,120
technology or facilities and absolutely

203
00:08:17,210 --> 00:08:14,639
I I fully expect that none of that will

204
00:08:19,129 --> 00:08:17,220
ever be in an unclassified setting and

205
00:08:21,290 --> 00:08:19,139
frankly I don't think it should be it's

206
00:08:24,170 --> 00:08:21,300
just such a sensitive topic

207
00:08:26,869 --> 00:08:24,180
um but I would be very very shocked to

208
00:08:29,570 --> 00:08:26,879
see members of Congress talk about this

209
00:08:31,909 --> 00:08:29,580
report so positively if it had been

210
00:08:33,529 --> 00:08:31,919
straight up ignored in the classified

211
00:08:35,810 --> 00:08:33,539
version so that's kind of what I was

212
00:08:39,529 --> 00:08:35,820
paying attention to and most members of

213
00:08:42,230 --> 00:08:39,539

Congress uh Timber aside seemed pretty

214

00:08:43,550 --> 00:08:42,240

uh pretty pleased at least preliminarily

215

00:08:45,350 --> 00:08:43,560

with the report

216

00:08:46,790 --> 00:08:45,360

yeah and we do see on this next page

217

00:08:48,769 --> 00:08:46,800

that it does state that the report was

218

00:08:50,449 --> 00:08:48,779

drafted by Nim aviation in conjunction

219

00:08:52,190 --> 00:08:50,459

with arrow but then in that list of all

220

00:08:54,650 --> 00:08:52,200

the different agencies below we do see

221

00:08:56,990 --> 00:08:54,660

the doe listed in there which is

222

00:08:58,610 --> 00:08:57,000

interesting but does it seem to you in

223

00:09:01,370 --> 00:08:58,620

any way that we're seeing more

224

00:09:04,070 --> 00:09:01,380

collaboration and good efforts between

225

00:09:05,509 --> 00:09:04,080

all the sort of uh interagencies and the

226

00:09:06,949 --> 00:09:05,519

the military branches coming together a

227

00:09:08,750 --> 00:09:06,959

little bit better than they were maybe

228

00:09:12,310 --> 00:09:08,760

for the preliminary assessment back in

229

00:09:16,490 --> 00:09:15,050

uh yeah I think the agencies are working

230

00:09:19,930 --> 00:09:16,500

closely together now and all the

231

00:09:24,470 --> 00:09:19,940

different offices and whatnot um I think

232

00:09:27,170 --> 00:09:24,480

I I think you're going to see

233

00:09:30,170 --> 00:09:27,180

um other agencies that say take an

234

00:09:32,269 --> 00:09:30,180

active interested in this whether that

235

00:09:33,530 --> 00:09:32,279

just leaks out or if it's made public by

236

00:09:37,310 --> 00:09:33,540

that

237

00:09:39,170 --> 00:09:37,320

military like Spaceballs for example I

238

00:09:41,509 --> 00:09:39,180

think we now know that space force is

239

00:09:45,170 --> 00:09:41,519

looking into UAP

240

00:09:47,930 --> 00:09:45,180

um that's why Lou was working there and

241

00:09:49,910 --> 00:09:47,940

um that continues so

242

00:09:51,889 --> 00:09:49,920

um hopefully we see more kind of like

243

00:09:53,810 --> 00:09:51,899

entering into the sphere

244

00:09:55,610 --> 00:09:53,820

um and we've got NASA as well looking

245

00:09:58,790 --> 00:09:55,620

into it as well

246

00:10:02,090 --> 00:09:58,800

um I think FAA is being played by so

247

00:10:04,430 --> 00:10:02,100

many reports at the moment as well about

248

00:10:06,530 --> 00:10:04,440

um encountering

249

00:10:08,870 --> 00:10:06,540

um strange things in the sky

250

00:10:10,370 --> 00:10:08,880

um which according some Pilots have you

251
00:10:12,730 --> 00:10:10,380
know gone up grammatically within this

252
00:10:15,889 --> 00:10:12,740
past year I mean some of that may be

253
00:10:16,790 --> 00:10:15,899
attributable to um starlink I think it

254
00:10:18,710 --> 00:10:16,800
is

255
00:10:20,150 --> 00:10:18,720
um but there are some cases which you

256
00:10:21,250 --> 00:10:20,160
think well that's doesn't really look

257
00:10:24,470 --> 00:10:21,260
like

258
00:10:28,070 --> 00:10:24,480
Elon Musk satellites

259
00:10:29,829 --> 00:10:28,080
yeah no I I agree I I particularly

260
00:10:32,630 --> 00:10:29,839
zoomed into

261
00:10:34,310 --> 00:10:32,640
odni Nim emerging and disruptive

262
00:10:35,690 --> 00:10:34,320
technology I thought that was a very

263
00:10:39,650 --> 00:10:35,700

interesting

264

00:10:42,889 --> 00:10:39,660

um uh office or or sub component of nim

265

00:10:46,370 --> 00:10:42,899

just because I know for a fact that DOD

266

00:10:49,610 --> 00:10:46,380

set up a new office in the last two

267

00:10:52,970 --> 00:10:49,620

years I thought I'm gonna kill myself I

268

00:10:54,410 --> 00:10:52,980

don't remember uh the exact uh name of

269

00:10:56,210 --> 00:10:54,420

it but it's something very similar to

270

00:10:58,730 --> 00:10:56,220

emerging and disruptive technology I'm

271

00:11:00,230 --> 00:10:58,740

not saying that that's a UAP office but

272

00:11:03,170 --> 00:11:00,240

I think it's interesting to see it

273

00:11:05,509 --> 00:11:03,180

situated within that sub function I

274

00:11:08,210 --> 00:11:05,519

think it's uh relevant it kind of

275

00:11:11,030 --> 00:11:08,220

Harkens back to I think the

276

00:11:12,889 --> 00:11:11,040

um the foreign technology offices that

277

00:11:13,970 --> 00:11:12,899

we hear a lot about in

278

00:11:15,170 --> 00:11:13,980

um you know like the course of

279

00:11:16,850 --> 00:11:15,180

narratives and things like that

280

00:11:18,050 --> 00:11:16,860

regardless of whether or not that's true

281

00:11:19,610 --> 00:11:18,060

I don't know

282

00:11:21,170 --> 00:11:19,620

um but that definitely piqued my

283

00:11:22,910 --> 00:11:21,180

interest a little bit

284

00:11:25,130 --> 00:11:22,920

yeah absolutely and already in these

285

00:11:26,990 --> 00:11:25,140

first few pages we're seeing um Odie and

286

00:11:29,990 --> 00:11:27,000

I mentioned a lot and there's a lack of

287

00:11:31,790 --> 00:11:30,000

OU SDI which was something that I know

288

00:11:33,410 --> 00:11:31,800

Chris you were concerned about and I was

289

00:11:35,930 --> 00:11:33,420

a little bit the way that the office was

290

00:11:38,509 --> 00:11:35,940

sat under them so what do we think so

291

00:11:39,829 --> 00:11:38,519

far with with respect to that do you

292

00:11:40,670 --> 00:11:39,839

think it's better now that it seems to

293

00:11:42,949 --> 00:11:40,680

be

294

00:11:44,389 --> 00:11:42,959

OD and I that's kind of overseeing it if

295

00:11:45,769 --> 00:11:44,399

I'm using the right words I don't know

296

00:11:48,530 --> 00:11:45,779

if I am exactly

297

00:11:50,870 --> 00:11:48,540

yeah yeah sure um so firstly sorry doe

298

00:11:52,870 --> 00:11:50,880

was mentioned I'm looking at the

299

00:11:55,250 --> 00:11:52,880

differences between 2020

300

00:11:56,269 --> 00:11:55,260

22s sorry so I was getting mixed up

301
00:11:58,550 --> 00:11:56,279
between them

302
00:12:01,970 --> 00:11:58,560
um it's at odni yeah so they published

303
00:12:04,970 --> 00:12:01,980
the um 2021 report as well so what

304
00:12:07,790 --> 00:12:04,980
basically happens is that there the the

305
00:12:09,769 --> 00:12:07,800
information the data gets given by

306
00:12:12,350 --> 00:12:09,779
um the office being arrow in in this

307
00:12:14,690 --> 00:12:12,360
case it was you youapft back then

308
00:12:17,090 --> 00:12:14,700
um to the odni and EOD and I just

309
00:12:18,110 --> 00:12:17,100
coordinate all this stuff basically and

310
00:12:24,110 --> 00:12:18,120
they

311
00:12:26,329 --> 00:12:24,120
um agencies and offices as well just to

312
00:12:28,190 --> 00:12:26,339
ensure that it's all correct and they're

313
00:12:30,350 --> 00:12:28,200

not not publishing anything they should

314

00:12:32,150 --> 00:12:30,360

do and they're all coordinating with

315

00:12:34,610 --> 00:12:32,160

each other before they do this but um

316

00:12:35,630 --> 00:12:34,620

there's also a process as well I mean

317

00:12:38,329 --> 00:12:35,640

um

318

00:12:41,630 --> 00:12:38,339

even though the report has only just

319

00:12:44,030 --> 00:12:41,640

been given to Congress that there is an

320

00:12:46,910 --> 00:12:44,040

ongoing process whereby

321

00:12:50,329 --> 00:12:46,920

um the legislative affairs section of

322

00:12:52,310 --> 00:12:50,339

odni is liaising with um with Congress

323

00:12:55,310 --> 00:12:52,320

and staffers just to ensure that it

324

00:12:57,829 --> 00:12:55,320

matches the the product as they call it

325

00:13:00,650 --> 00:12:57,839

matches the intent as per the National

326

00:13:03,290 --> 00:13:00,660

Defense authorization Act

327

00:13:04,670 --> 00:13:03,300

yeah and I think just to add on to that

328

00:13:05,629 --> 00:13:04,680

one of the interesting things is when

329

00:13:07,730 --> 00:13:05,639

you're looking at the scope and

330

00:13:10,790 --> 00:13:07,740

assumptions page and you look at all of

331

00:13:13,009 --> 00:13:10,800

the various offices that are listed I

332

00:13:16,310 --> 00:13:13,019

think the longer you have that paragraph

333

00:13:17,870 --> 00:13:16,320

the less input the more sanitized this

334

00:13:19,370 --> 00:13:17,880

report is going to be because you have

335

00:13:22,670 --> 00:13:19,380

to realize there are going to be people

336

00:13:25,790 --> 00:13:22,680

in each office who may not be editing

337

00:13:27,949 --> 00:13:25,800

the final report but have say and have

338

00:13:29,569 --> 00:13:27,959

um ideas about what should be said and

339

00:13:31,129 --> 00:13:29,579

shouldn't be said and so I think uh

340

00:13:33,470 --> 00:13:31,139

we'll talk about you know Dr Sean

341

00:13:35,750 --> 00:13:33,480

Kirkpatrick's slides later but I think

342

00:13:37,430 --> 00:13:35,760

what's really interesting is looking at

343

00:13:39,230 --> 00:13:37,440

the big difference between the two and I

344

00:13:42,889 --> 00:13:39,240

think a lot of that can really come down

345

00:13:44,990 --> 00:13:42,899

to the sheer volume of folks in offices

346

00:13:47,449 --> 00:13:45,000

that have input into this report

347

00:13:49,009 --> 00:13:47,459

yeah absolutely that is really

348

00:13:51,470 --> 00:13:49,019

interesting to have kind of both things

349

00:13:53,509 --> 00:13:51,480

almost released a day after one another

350

00:13:55,550 --> 00:13:53,519

to then be able to compare the two to

351

00:13:58,250 --> 00:13:55,560

see the differences it was it spoke

352

00:13:59,750 --> 00:13:58,260

volumes to to some people uh just

353

00:14:01,370 --> 00:13:59,760

sticking with this page I found that

354

00:14:03,110 --> 00:14:01,380

assumptions fairly interesting at the

355

00:14:04,550 --> 00:14:03,120

bottom saying you know that multiple

356

00:14:06,230 --> 00:14:04,560

factors affect the observation and

357

00:14:08,389 --> 00:14:06,240

detection and but then they're going you

358

00:14:10,910 --> 00:14:08,399

know obviously under the assumption that

359

00:14:12,470 --> 00:14:10,920

you're getting clear statements from

360

00:14:14,269 --> 00:14:12,480

these Witnesses you know they're

361

00:14:16,550 --> 00:14:14,279

actually telling what they saw

362

00:14:18,590 --> 00:14:16,560

accurately but then the assumptions that

363

00:14:21,530 --> 00:14:18,600

all the sensor systems are are working

364

00:14:23,210 --> 00:14:21,540

properly as well and I mean it makes me

365

00:14:25,190 --> 00:14:23,220

smile because you you would just have to

366

00:14:26,690 --> 00:14:25,200

assume that this is like multi-billion

367

00:14:28,730 --> 00:14:26,700

dollar equipment that they're talking

368

00:14:31,550 --> 00:14:28,740

about I mean how often does it actually

369

00:14:33,170 --> 00:14:31,560

fail it's it's I I just find it really

370

00:14:35,870 --> 00:14:33,180

interesting that they word things in

371

00:14:37,509 --> 00:14:35,880

certain ways yeah well look when when I

372

00:14:40,009 --> 00:14:37,519

went to the round table

373

00:14:41,930 --> 00:14:40,019

I asked you know

374

00:14:45,050 --> 00:14:41,940

um they had seen anything so I'm just

375

00:14:46,850 --> 00:14:45,060

looking question right now yeah I um I

376

00:14:48,889 --> 00:14:46,860

said have you detected UAP demonstrating

377

00:14:51,110 --> 00:14:48,899

technology which you are unable to

378

00:14:52,970 --> 00:14:51,120

explain because Patrick started going

379

00:14:55,550 --> 00:14:52,980

into that thing yeah there are some

380

00:14:57,949 --> 00:14:55,560

interesting Dynamics there with flights

381

00:15:00,769 --> 00:14:57,959

and then mockery button basically is

382

00:15:02,689 --> 00:15:00,779

saying but Sean is that partly that that

383

00:15:05,449 --> 00:15:02,699

that's something to do with um sensor

384

00:15:07,310 --> 00:15:05,459

phenomenology sir and then Patrick just

385

00:15:09,050 --> 00:15:07,320

went in that direction which is quite

386

00:15:10,850 --> 00:15:09,060

funny because that's probably that

387

00:15:13,189 --> 00:15:10,860

they're trying to gloss it over in the

388

00:15:15,350 --> 00:15:13,199

words of the odni source that spoke to

389

00:15:17,210 --> 00:15:15,360

my colleague in October

390

00:15:18,530 --> 00:15:17,220

um Josh Boswell

391

00:15:21,410 --> 00:15:18,540

um so they're trying to gloss over and

392

00:15:23,569 --> 00:15:21,420

also like if you go on to uh page number

393

00:15:25,430 --> 00:15:23,579

five sorry if you go forward on that

394

00:15:27,710 --> 00:15:25,440

it's kind of got contradicted because it

395

00:15:29,990 --> 00:15:27,720

states on there continued reporting and

396

00:15:32,930 --> 00:15:30,000

robust analysis are providing better

397

00:15:35,269 --> 00:15:32,940

Fidelity on the UAP events but many

398

00:15:37,310 --> 00:15:35,279

cases remain unresolved

399

00:15:38,990 --> 00:15:37,320

so yeah I found that really strange and

400

00:15:40,189 --> 00:15:39,000

you know we can go back to page four in

401
00:15:42,009 --> 00:15:40,199
a minute but we're talking about the

402
00:15:44,509 --> 00:15:42,019
characterizations of all these different

403
00:15:46,310 --> 00:15:44,519
possible things and then they have to

404
00:15:47,750 --> 00:15:46,320
caveat by saying initial

405
00:15:50,410 --> 00:15:47,760
characterization does not mean

406
00:15:52,550 --> 00:15:50,420
positively resolved it's like well

407
00:15:54,769 --> 00:15:52,560
what have you done what have you

408
00:15:56,269 --> 00:15:54,779
actually confirmed like what what are

409
00:15:58,870 --> 00:15:56,279
you doing what are you saying here I

410
00:16:02,090 --> 00:15:58,880
can't kind of grasp that really

411
00:16:04,310 --> 00:16:02,100
honestly it comes down to understanding

412
00:16:06,730 --> 00:16:04,320
the federal government they are never

413
00:16:10,490 --> 00:16:06,740

going to definitively say anything

414

00:16:13,009 --> 00:16:10,500

unless they are 100 sure and so you're

415

00:16:14,509 --> 00:16:13,019

going to see these these caveats layered

416

00:16:16,009 --> 00:16:14,519

on caveats

417

00:16:19,850 --> 00:16:16,019

um because the last thing they want to

418

00:16:22,790 --> 00:16:19,860

do is say oh yeah 163 were characterized

419

00:16:24,710 --> 00:16:22,800

as balloons and then have one turn out

420

00:16:27,050 --> 00:16:24,720

to be something else and then you know

421

00:16:28,430 --> 00:16:27,060

the media pounces on it so I really

422

00:16:31,790 --> 00:16:28,440

think what you're seeing here is a lot

423

00:16:34,970 --> 00:16:31,800

of covering your butt and uh hoping that

424

00:16:36,350 --> 00:16:34,980

you know they will not have to worry

425

00:16:38,930 --> 00:16:36,360

about ever being incorrect about

426

00:16:42,730 --> 00:16:38,940

anything look right here I've got a

427

00:16:47,329 --> 00:16:45,170

yeah what in the world is a balloon-like

428

00:16:49,370 --> 00:16:47,339

entity can we just address that one for

429

00:16:51,949 --> 00:16:49,380

a second like I understand what a

430

00:16:54,530 --> 00:16:51,959

balloon is a balloon identity not so

431

00:16:56,749 --> 00:16:54,540

much I mean entity does scream like

432

00:16:59,749 --> 00:16:56,759

biological

433

00:17:01,129 --> 00:16:59,759

to me it would that's the first thing I

434

00:17:03,650 --> 00:17:01,139

think of you know

435

00:17:05,510 --> 00:17:03,660

um it's just bizarre isn't it what I

436

00:17:07,970 --> 00:17:05,520

imagine is those like wacky inflatable

437

00:17:08,890 --> 00:17:07,980

tube guys I've ever seen those in the

438

00:17:11,809 --> 00:17:08,900

sky

439

00:17:13,490 --> 00:17:11,819

that's yeah that's just incredible isn't

440

00:17:15,169 --> 00:17:13,500

it to see that but before we dig any

441

00:17:16,130 --> 00:17:15,179

deeper on this let's just jump back to

442

00:17:18,890 --> 00:17:16,140

page

443

00:17:20,569 --> 00:17:18,900

four so we've got here it's basically

444

00:17:22,549 --> 00:17:20,579

the establishment of Arrow talking about

445

00:17:23,329 --> 00:17:22,559

the multi-agency collaborations and

446

00:17:26,090 --> 00:17:23,339

stuff

447

00:17:29,150 --> 00:17:26,100

uh yeah I don't think there's much there

448

00:17:30,890 --> 00:17:29,160

that we can't can really dig deep into I

449

00:17:32,570 --> 00:17:30,900

suppose Aviation will remain in the

450

00:17:35,090 --> 00:17:32,580

intelligence community's focal point for

451
00:17:37,070 --> 00:17:35,100
the UAP issue while arrow is the dod

452
00:17:39,409 --> 00:17:37,080
focal point for these issues and related

453
00:17:41,330 --> 00:17:39,419
activities so it does seem that nem

454
00:17:43,370 --> 00:17:41,340
Aviation is right in there dealing with

455
00:17:45,169 --> 00:17:43,380
the the IC side of things does that

456
00:17:48,169 --> 00:17:45,179
surprise anyone at all or is there

457
00:17:50,630 --> 00:17:48,179
anything you can glean from that

458
00:17:52,970 --> 00:17:50,640
no I mean I just assume that within the

459
00:17:54,650 --> 00:17:52,980
odni that's the office that got tasked

460
00:17:56,450 --> 00:17:54,660
with kind of taking the helm on here

461
00:17:59,029 --> 00:17:56,460
because I mean you have to realize odini

462
00:18:01,610 --> 00:17:59,039
is huge so saying that odni is going to

463
00:18:03,289 --> 00:18:01,620

be handling this is incredibly vague so

464

00:18:06,590 --> 00:18:03,299

I don't I don't think that's remarkable

465

00:18:09,529 --> 00:18:06,600

I do think it makes the logo fascinating

466

00:18:12,710 --> 00:18:09,539

and I do think it makes those patches a

467

00:18:14,330 --> 00:18:12,720

lot extra valuable I I agree completely

468

00:18:15,770 --> 00:18:14,340

Chris is there anything you can gain

469

00:18:17,830 --> 00:18:15,780

from this page in particular that you

470

00:18:20,570 --> 00:18:17,840

think is worth pointing out

471

00:18:22,680 --> 00:18:20,580

uh on this particular page

472

00:18:27,230 --> 00:18:25,029

[Music]

473

00:18:28,970 --> 00:18:27,240

this wording sorry things right but just

474

00:18:31,190 --> 00:18:28,980

look in there the broad scope of

475

00:18:32,210 --> 00:18:31,200

authority granted to Arrow things like

476
00:18:34,130 --> 00:18:32,220
that it's

477
00:18:35,990 --> 00:18:34,140
you know

478
00:18:38,450 --> 00:18:36,000
it's just interesting go on sorry I

479
00:18:39,910 --> 00:18:38,460
interrupted

480
00:18:43,610 --> 00:18:39,920
no no

481
00:18:50,110 --> 00:18:45,169
that's one I mean it speaks for itself

482
00:18:53,210 --> 00:18:50,120
really I mean Nim Aviation yeah that

483
00:18:54,710 --> 00:18:53,220
that's interesting

484
00:18:58,310 --> 00:18:54,720
um I can't really say a lot more about

485
00:18:59,870 --> 00:18:58,320
that really interesting let's say

486
00:19:02,090 --> 00:18:59,880
um yeah so

487
00:19:03,350 --> 00:19:02,100
um yeah I mean there's nothing else I

488
00:19:05,210 --> 00:19:03,360

can already say

489

00:19:07,190 --> 00:19:05,220

um on that to be fair but there's a lot

490

00:19:09,890 --> 00:19:07,200

of technicalities on there

491

00:19:11,350 --> 00:19:09,900

um so yeah yeah I think you're right I

492

00:19:13,970 --> 00:19:11,360

think that that's it

493

00:19:16,909 --> 00:19:13,980

one other thing that jumped out on this

494

00:19:18,770 --> 00:19:16,919

page to me real quick before everyone

495

00:19:20,630 --> 00:19:18,780

um when you see in the first paragraph

496

00:19:23,630 --> 00:19:20,640

Arrow will coordinate with other non-ic

497

00:19:26,930 --> 00:19:23,640

agencies including non-ic elements of

498

00:19:28,850 --> 00:19:26,940

DHS that stood out to me um I think what

499

00:19:31,730 --> 00:19:28,860

they're saying there because

500

00:19:33,590 --> 00:19:31,740

I believe I could be wrong I believe FBI

501

00:19:35,029 --> 00:19:33,600

is considered icy

502

00:19:37,010 --> 00:19:35,039

um so it would fall under odni so

503

00:19:38,270 --> 00:19:37,020

they're not talking about FBI here I

504

00:19:40,250 --> 00:19:38,280

think what they're talking about is like

505

00:19:41,630 --> 00:19:40,260

Customs and Border Protection which

506

00:19:43,909 --> 00:19:41,640

stood out to me because we're seeing

507

00:19:45,950 --> 00:19:43,919

lots of reports along the border

508

00:19:47,029 --> 00:19:45,960

um so that that definitely stood out to

509

00:19:49,310 --> 00:19:47,039

me and I think that's something

510

00:19:51,590 --> 00:19:49,320

interesting to pay attention to

511

00:19:53,210 --> 00:19:51,600

yeah that's definitely interesting yeah

512

00:19:55,190 --> 00:19:53,220

well if you want to if they want to talk

513

00:19:57,529 --> 00:19:55,200

about the Border I mean if you think by

514

00:20:00,470 --> 00:19:57,539

like 2004 limits encounter that was kind

515

00:20:02,450 --> 00:20:00,480

of like close to the Border as well in

516

00:20:05,930 --> 00:20:02,460

terms of that area so um I think that's

517

00:20:07,970 --> 00:20:05,940

quite interesting yeah absolutely

518

00:20:10,549 --> 00:20:07,980

maybe I'm biased as a San Diego

519

00:20:12,770 --> 00:20:10,559

border stuff but

520

00:20:14,690 --> 00:20:12,780

we have had reports of a lot of things

521

00:20:16,789 --> 00:20:14,700

across the South American Border as well

522

00:20:18,289 --> 00:20:16,799

Mexico and things like that so it's

523

00:20:19,789 --> 00:20:18,299

certainly worth bearing in mind and I

524

00:20:20,870 --> 00:20:19,799

think that was really interesting that I

525

00:20:22,669 --> 00:20:20,880

wouldn't have been able to break it down

526

00:20:25,250 --> 00:20:22,679

like that so I find it

527

00:20:26,870 --> 00:20:25,260

intriguing in the least so anything on

528

00:20:28,850 --> 00:20:26,880

this page and obviously we've got the

529

00:20:30,409 --> 00:20:28,860

the numbers here and I think like we

530

00:20:32,810 --> 00:20:30,419

already mentioned it was interesting to

531

00:20:34,370 --> 00:20:32,820

see these higher numbers it was good and

532

00:20:36,230 --> 00:20:34,380

Chris this was something that was

533

00:20:39,770 --> 00:20:36,240

reported on by yourself and Josh back in

534

00:20:41,150 --> 00:20:39,780

October and the numbers turned out to be

535

00:20:43,669 --> 00:20:41,160

pretty much the same as what you

536

00:20:45,409 --> 00:20:43,679

reported on like back then which then

537

00:20:47,690 --> 00:20:45,419

makes me think that other things that

538

00:20:50,150 --> 00:20:47,700

were featured in that story may also

539

00:20:51,770 --> 00:20:50,160

hold a lot of weight such as you know

540

00:20:53,270 --> 00:20:51,780

there was that one incident in the

541

00:20:55,010 --> 00:20:53,280

Middle East with the reaper drones and

542

00:20:56,570 --> 00:20:55,020

the orbs and that that part we you know

543

00:20:59,390 --> 00:20:56,580

there was nothing like that featured in

544

00:21:01,070 --> 00:20:59,400

this report so that to me then puts a

545

00:21:03,010 --> 00:21:01,080

lot of weight on that particular case

546

00:21:05,750 --> 00:21:03,020

for example that these things are being

547

00:21:07,610 --> 00:21:05,760

reported and picked up so how you know

548

00:21:09,409 --> 00:21:07,620

do you want to speak to that

549

00:21:10,970 --> 00:21:09,419

absolutely I mean I can't take her in

550

00:21:13,190 --> 00:21:10,980

for that Josh just got all that that

551
00:21:15,230 --> 00:21:13,200
really surprised me because we're trying

552
00:21:17,450 --> 00:21:15,240
to find sources basically to tell us

553
00:21:20,090 --> 00:21:17,460
stuff and give us the inside story I

554
00:21:21,770 --> 00:21:20,100
didn't hear from Joshua and it just came

555
00:21:22,990 --> 00:21:21,780
from nowhere I was like bloody how would

556
00:21:26,390 --> 00:21:23,000
that come from

557
00:21:29,029 --> 00:21:26,400
anyone to get like an odni Source like

558
00:21:30,950 --> 00:21:29,039
that to speak out but I think it was in

559
00:21:33,409 --> 00:21:30,960
answer to

560
00:21:34,789 --> 00:21:33,419
um barnes's article basically and I

561
00:21:36,230 --> 00:21:34,799
think the source themselves said look

562
00:21:39,649 --> 00:21:36,240
they're trying to cross things over here

563
00:21:42,470 --> 00:21:39,659

and the source said you know there's a s

564

00:21:44,330 --> 00:21:42,480

hit loads of classified videos that are

565

00:21:45,529 --> 00:21:44,340

pretty profound pretty clear they don't

566

00:21:47,570 --> 00:21:45,539

want to talk about this stuff because

567

00:21:50,510 --> 00:21:47,580

they really really don't know what the

568

00:21:52,130 --> 00:21:50,520

hell they are and that's the truth uh

569

00:21:54,649 --> 00:21:52,140

and you've got things like he explains

570

00:21:57,710 --> 00:21:54,659

here you know that um object diving into

571

00:21:59,750 --> 00:21:57,720

the ocean without making a splash

572

00:22:02,090 --> 00:21:59,760

um and that's really interesting because

573

00:22:03,950 --> 00:22:02,100

if that's true and we've seen the

574

00:22:05,570 --> 00:22:03,960

Corbell video of that thing going under

575

00:22:08,330 --> 00:22:05,580

the water

576
00:22:09,770 --> 00:22:08,340
without apparent stash although the crew

577
00:22:11,630 --> 00:22:09,780
does say it because that's a term

578
00:22:14,330 --> 00:22:11,640
knowledge for you but he's got a baby

579
00:22:17,390 --> 00:22:14,340
saying it's going underwater but that

580
00:22:19,070 --> 00:22:17,400
contradicts what Moultrie said at the

581
00:22:21,289 --> 00:22:19,080
media round table because he basically

582
00:22:22,850 --> 00:22:21,299
said that we hadn't seen any trans

583
00:22:28,549 --> 00:22:22,860
medium

584
00:22:30,590 --> 00:22:28,559
um well any credible reporting anyhow so

585
00:22:32,810 --> 00:22:30,600
I mean there's all these qualifiers you

586
00:22:36,230 --> 00:22:32,820
know that they're using an incredible

587
00:22:37,490 --> 00:22:36,240
reporting not any reporting so yeah I

588
00:22:39,529 --> 00:22:37,500

mean they've got to be really careful

589

00:22:41,750 --> 00:22:39,539

now these people do because you know the

590

00:22:43,970 --> 00:22:41,760

new ndaa does make it clear that they're

591

00:22:46,970 --> 00:22:43,980

going to be looking at all the times

592

00:22:48,590 --> 00:22:46,980

when government officials have misled

593

00:22:51,049 --> 00:22:48,600

um the public when it comes to this

594

00:22:52,789 --> 00:22:51,059

topic so um I would count that as kind

595

00:22:54,770 --> 00:22:52,799

of misleading because even though

596

00:22:56,810 --> 00:22:54,780

they're careful with their statements

597

00:22:59,149 --> 00:22:56,820

the media just tends to run with them

598

00:23:00,710 --> 00:22:59,159

without looking at the nuances and the

599

00:23:02,810 --> 00:23:00,720

same goes to this report as well which

600

00:23:04,310 --> 00:23:02,820

we'll get on to later

601
00:23:05,870 --> 00:23:04,320
I think that you brought up a really

602
00:23:07,610 --> 00:23:05,880
good point Chris and this is something I

603
00:23:09,409 --> 00:23:07,620
was on a foreign policy podcast a couple

604
00:23:12,289 --> 00:23:09,419
days ago and that was something I

605
00:23:14,690 --> 00:23:12,299
brought up is that I think a lot of the

606
00:23:16,669 --> 00:23:14,700
media the journalists who should know

607
00:23:19,549 --> 00:23:16,679
better who should be digging in piece by

608
00:23:21,649 --> 00:23:19,559
piece in these reports they do they zero

609
00:23:23,990 --> 00:23:21,659
in on those little comments and they

610
00:23:25,850 --> 00:23:24,000
don't look at what actually is backing

611
00:23:28,190 --> 00:23:25,860
it up because a lot of times it's very

612
00:23:31,490 --> 00:23:28,200
very different or you know people who

613
00:23:33,890 --> 00:23:31,500

are capable of reporting on very nuanced

614

00:23:36,770 --> 00:23:33,900

public policy for some reason are

615

00:23:40,310 --> 00:23:36,780

incapable of reporting on Nuance in this

616

00:23:43,190 --> 00:23:40,320

topic and that's why you know I I I said

617

00:23:46,370 --> 00:23:43,200

earlier this week print out the report

618

00:23:50,210 --> 00:23:46,380

read it yourself go line by line because

619

00:23:52,610 --> 00:23:50,220

oftentimes a single word is important

620

00:23:54,710 --> 00:23:52,620

um in the overall view of it

621

00:23:56,750 --> 00:23:54,720

yeah I completely agree and a lot of

622

00:23:57,950 --> 00:23:56,760

people were instantly saying well it's a

623

00:24:00,890 --> 00:23:57,960

nothing Burger there's no decent

624

00:24:02,210 --> 00:24:00,900

information and I totally disagree and

625

00:24:04,190 --> 00:24:02,220

then people would say yeah but you're

626

00:24:05,930 --> 00:24:04,200

just clutching at straws you know you're

627

00:24:08,330 --> 00:24:05,940

naive to think that there's anything in

628

00:24:10,549 --> 00:24:08,340

here and again I disagree it's very

629

00:24:12,649 --> 00:24:10,559

difficult isn't it when

630

00:24:14,690 --> 00:24:12,659

you know lack of information is also

631

00:24:16,190 --> 00:24:14,700

information

632

00:24:17,870 --> 00:24:16,200

I mean it just points there's certain

633

00:24:20,210 --> 00:24:17,880

things that you

634

00:24:22,549 --> 00:24:20,220

going forward you know yeah this isn't a

635

00:24:23,810 --> 00:24:22,559

bombshell and it never was gonna be you

636

00:24:25,730 --> 00:24:23,820

know this is clearly laying out

637

00:24:27,950 --> 00:24:25,740

procedures and and things like that

638

00:24:30,169 --> 00:24:27,960

moving forward for Arrow and the scope

639

00:24:31,370 --> 00:24:30,179

of what they're going to do and and I

640

00:24:33,169 --> 00:24:31,380

found that great

641

00:24:34,370 --> 00:24:33,179

um and just talking about Chris you

642

00:24:36,169 --> 00:24:34,380

mentioned there that there were

643

00:24:38,270 --> 00:24:36,179

obviously videos and things that were

644

00:24:40,250 --> 00:24:38,280

analyzed and looked at and we see the

645

00:24:42,110 --> 00:24:40,260

lines saying that some UAP appear to

646

00:24:43,789 --> 00:24:42,120

have demonstrated unusual flight

647

00:24:46,010 --> 00:24:43,799

characteristics or performance

648

00:24:48,169 --> 00:24:46,020

capabilities and require further

649

00:24:49,850 --> 00:24:48,179

analysis I mean that's a big line for me

650

00:24:52,250 --> 00:24:49,860

personally because it shows that they

651
00:24:54,770 --> 00:24:52,260
are looking at something bizarre

652
00:24:58,010 --> 00:24:54,780
that is the key that is the key line to

653
00:25:00,529 --> 00:24:58,020
me and they they don't they they don't

654
00:25:02,450 --> 00:25:00,539
expand upon that at least the

655
00:25:05,450 --> 00:25:02,460
preliminary report that was released in

656
00:25:07,549 --> 00:25:05,460
2021 they did talk about some of these

657
00:25:09,529 --> 00:25:07,559
capabilities

658
00:25:11,630 --> 00:25:09,539
um but they don't they don't do it in

659
00:25:13,490 --> 00:25:11,640
this one so they're trying to close the

660
00:25:15,590 --> 00:25:13,500
shop when it comes to expanding more on

661
00:25:19,250 --> 00:25:15,600
this which is why I found some of the

662
00:25:21,710 --> 00:25:19,260
things that occurred recently with John

663
00:25:23,510 --> 00:25:21,720

Radcliffe basically saying look this is

664

00:25:25,610 --> 00:25:23,520

like against the law of physics the

665

00:25:27,470 --> 00:25:25,620

things that these things are these

666

00:25:28,549 --> 00:25:27,480

objects are doing so

667

00:25:31,430 --> 00:25:28,559

um I think there's gonna be major

668

00:25:33,950 --> 00:25:31,440

pushback by them trying to control this

669

00:25:36,409 --> 00:25:33,960

narrative and trying to gloss over as

670

00:25:37,850 --> 00:25:36,419

that odnisource said some of the insane

671

00:25:40,010 --> 00:25:37,860

things that they've actually been able

672

00:25:41,750 --> 00:25:40,020

to capture so that that's really really

673

00:25:44,269 --> 00:25:41,760

important and that is the one thing I

674

00:25:46,250 --> 00:25:44,279

tried to push on when I actually spoke

675

00:25:48,470 --> 00:25:46,260

to Kirkpatrick and Moultrie and they

676
00:25:51,169 --> 00:25:48,480
need to be more they need to be more

677
00:25:52,190 --> 00:25:51,179
open about this I think frankly do you

678
00:25:54,590 --> 00:25:52,200
think that they can do that without

679
00:25:58,490 --> 00:25:54,600
divulging sources and methods though

680
00:26:01,310 --> 00:25:58,500
yeah I think they can look they

681
00:26:03,409 --> 00:26:01,320
they've recently

682
00:26:05,870 --> 00:26:03,419
I mean you look you look time I mean

683
00:26:07,549 --> 00:26:05,880
whether it's the mod where it's the U.S

684
00:26:09,289 --> 00:26:07,559
military they'll release videos when

685
00:26:10,789 --> 00:26:09,299
they want when they want to

686
00:26:12,169 --> 00:26:10,799
send out message about Russian

687
00:26:14,690 --> 00:26:12,179
aggression

688
00:26:17,890 --> 00:26:14,700

um showing you know Russian Jets talking

689

00:26:21,769 --> 00:26:17,900

their own aircraft and other adverse

690

00:26:25,850 --> 00:26:21,779

adversary actions taken when it suits

691

00:26:27,529 --> 00:26:25,860

them you know and and recently as well

692

00:26:29,149 --> 00:26:27,539

with the Ukraine situation they've been

693

00:26:30,950 --> 00:26:29,159

a lot more open in terms of what they

694

00:26:33,470 --> 00:26:30,960

can share publicly in terms of their

695

00:26:36,289 --> 00:26:33,480

intelligence so they can go that little

696

00:26:39,649 --> 00:26:36,299

bit further if they if they want to but

697

00:26:41,570 --> 00:26:39,659

for some reason they're not and I think

698

00:26:43,730 --> 00:26:41,580

that's going to cause problems going

699

00:26:44,990 --> 00:26:43,740

forward and people aren't going to trust

700

00:26:46,610 --> 00:26:45,000

them because there is a lack of

701
00:26:48,890 --> 00:26:46,620
transparency

702
00:26:51,529 --> 00:26:48,900
um regarding this process and it's it's

703
00:26:52,310 --> 00:26:51,539
not good and the key question is you

704
00:26:55,310 --> 00:26:52,320
know

705
00:26:56,930 --> 00:26:55,320
um what is this you unusual

706
00:26:58,789 --> 00:26:56,940
what are these unusual flight

707
00:27:02,870 --> 00:26:58,799
characteristics performance capabilities

708
00:27:05,990 --> 00:27:02,880
and do you believe that any foreign

709
00:27:09,769 --> 00:27:06,000
Nations or adversaries are capable of

710
00:27:11,149 --> 00:27:09,779
this capability or technology that's the

711
00:27:12,890 --> 00:27:11,159
key question

712
00:27:15,590 --> 00:27:12,900
well and I I think it's important to

713
00:27:17,870 --> 00:27:15,600

remember two things on this one is that

714

00:27:19,850 --> 00:27:17,880

the US government is never going to

715

00:27:22,130 --> 00:27:19,860

share information just for the heck of

716

00:27:23,330 --> 00:27:22,140

it you know what I mean it's they're

717

00:27:25,730 --> 00:27:23,340

going to share information when there's

718

00:27:27,409 --> 00:27:25,740

a strategic advantage to do so so for

719

00:27:29,510 --> 00:27:27,419

example one of the things I saw in here

720

00:27:31,930 --> 00:27:29,520

was actually no I'm sorry this was in

721

00:27:34,970 --> 00:27:31,940

the Kirkpatrick slides concern over

722

00:27:38,269 --> 00:27:34,980

whether or not our our allies or

723

00:27:40,549 --> 00:27:38,279

adversaries might misattribute a UAP to

724

00:27:43,610 --> 00:27:40,559

U.S tech which could be very provocative

725

00:27:45,769 --> 00:27:43,620

right and so I think there we need to

726

00:27:47,990 --> 00:27:45,779

realize that there may be times when we

727

00:27:50,750 --> 00:27:48,000

share information not because we care

728

00:27:52,909 --> 00:27:50,760

about disclosure but because we want to

729

00:27:54,710 --> 00:27:52,919

make something very clear that hey we

730

00:27:57,110 --> 00:27:54,720

weren't buzzing your nuclear facilities

731

00:27:58,850 --> 00:27:57,120

you know like like don't don't go to war

732

00:28:02,149 --> 00:27:58,860

with us about this

733

00:28:03,950 --> 00:28:02,159

um so that's number one and number two

734

00:28:05,870 --> 00:28:03,960

is something that I completely forgot

735

00:28:07,490 --> 00:28:05,880

and it just left my room don't worry

736

00:28:09,470 --> 00:28:07,500

chime in if it comes back into effect

737

00:28:11,149 --> 00:28:09,480

don't worry don't worry

738

00:28:12,169 --> 00:28:11,159

I suppose the other thing that jumped

739

00:28:13,490 --> 00:28:12,179

out to me on here was that they're

740

00:28:15,409 --> 00:28:13,500

saying that the majority of the new

741

00:28:16,730 --> 00:28:15,419

cases came from the both the Air Force

742

00:28:19,250 --> 00:28:16,740

and the Navy and then obviously in the

743

00:28:20,930 --> 00:28:19,260

preliminary preliminary assessment there

744

00:28:22,730 --> 00:28:20,940

was a certain lack of the Air Force

745

00:28:24,529 --> 00:28:22,740

involvement so you know I think we've

746

00:28:26,630 --> 00:28:24,539

been crying out for that but I I'm not

747

00:28:28,310 --> 00:28:26,640

convinced 100 that it's just all of a

748

00:28:32,090 --> 00:28:28,320

sudden they're just talking and

749

00:28:35,149 --> 00:28:32,100

collaborating any thoughts on that

750

00:28:37,549 --> 00:28:35,159

I want to know where space force is true

751
00:28:40,370 --> 00:28:37,559
that's a great question yeah good point

752
00:28:44,149 --> 00:28:41,750
thought worse

753
00:28:46,970 --> 00:28:44,159
um yeah I highly doubt that suddenly

754
00:28:49,970 --> 00:28:46,980
after 70 years they're just perfectly

755
00:28:51,350 --> 00:28:49,980
um compliant uh but yeah we're missing a

756
00:28:53,570 --> 00:28:51,360
couple branches there

757
00:28:55,310 --> 00:28:53,580
I'd maybe maybe Marines have seen

758
00:28:56,510 --> 00:28:55,320
something I don't know um but I would

759
00:29:00,049 --> 00:28:56,520
like to

760
00:29:02,210 --> 00:29:00,059
space force especially considering there

761
00:29:04,850 --> 00:29:02,220
might be some very intelligent people

762
00:29:07,370 --> 00:29:04,860
working for space force on this topic so

763
00:29:09,890 --> 00:29:07,380

I'm very curious about that

764

00:29:11,029 --> 00:29:09,900

yeah absolutely Chris any thoughts on

765

00:29:13,490 --> 00:29:11,039

the Air Force

766

00:29:16,549 --> 00:29:13,500

so on space wars firstly yeah multiple

767

00:29:18,289 --> 00:29:16,559

people told me that space force are

768

00:29:20,990 --> 00:29:18,299

studying this and this is why Louis

769

00:29:22,970 --> 00:29:21,000

zande was was working there as well for

770

00:29:24,649 --> 00:29:22,980

my understanding that there is an

771

00:29:25,909 --> 00:29:24,659

ongoing effort with space force so I

772

00:29:28,970 --> 00:29:25,919

just don't know when they're going to

773

00:29:31,549 --> 00:29:28,980

publicly acknowledge that

774

00:29:34,370 --> 00:29:31,559

um but we'll we'll have to see

775

00:29:37,610 --> 00:29:34,380

um in terms of U.S Air Force yeah so it

776

00:29:39,889 --> 00:29:37,620

confirmed to me that it did not extend

777

00:29:42,889 --> 00:29:39,899

its pilot program

778

00:29:45,830 --> 00:29:42,899

um to look into UAP hotspot like I think

779

00:29:49,310 --> 00:29:45,840

it was a particular UAP hotspot so

780

00:29:51,110 --> 00:29:49,320

um that was interesting so I I don't

781

00:29:52,610 --> 00:29:51,120

understand where the Air Force is at at

782

00:29:54,830 --> 00:29:52,620

the moment currently

783

00:29:56,810 --> 00:29:54,840

um in terms of this because

784

00:29:59,149 --> 00:29:56,820

I don't know if my understanding the

785

00:30:00,950 --> 00:29:59,159

stigma is still attached to the topic of

786

00:30:03,590 --> 00:30:00,960

in the Air Force so I don't know how

787

00:30:06,470 --> 00:30:03,600

many new cases are going to get reported

788

00:30:09,529 --> 00:30:06,480

um as compared with the U.S naval Navy

789

00:30:12,830 --> 00:30:09,539

which is doing more to help erase the

790

00:30:15,350 --> 00:30:12,840

stigma so I I mean it is definitely an

791

00:30:16,730 --> 00:30:15,360

interesting situation but from my

792

00:30:19,850 --> 00:30:16,740

understanding

793

00:30:21,830 --> 00:30:19,860

um one uaptf is getting started it

794

00:30:25,130 --> 00:30:21,840

looked like the

795

00:30:27,710 --> 00:30:25,140

um US Air Force was going to start

796

00:30:29,690 --> 00:30:27,720

um cooperating with them and working

797

00:30:31,730 --> 00:30:29,700

together with them but then all of a

798

00:30:33,250 --> 00:30:31,740

sudden they just did a complete U-turn

799

00:30:35,630 --> 00:30:33,260

and

800

00:30:38,029 --> 00:30:35,640

umap topic again

801

00:30:39,289 --> 00:30:38,039

yeah yeah absolutely

802

00:30:40,549 --> 00:30:39,299

um now just this last bit at the bottom

803

00:30:42,409 --> 00:30:40,559

of the page this partnership's in

804

00:30:44,510 --> 00:30:42,419

collaboration it was good to see the FAA

805

00:30:45,889 --> 00:30:44,520

and NASA mentioned but I found it

806

00:30:48,769 --> 00:30:45,899

interesting where they said that Aria is

807

00:30:50,810 --> 00:30:48,779

working closely with OSD PA and Mission

808

00:30:52,730 --> 00:30:50,820

Partners to develop information sharing

809

00:30:56,450 --> 00:30:52,740

and messaging strategy that aims to

810

00:30:59,029 --> 00:30:56,460

maximize transparency I mean okay if you

811

00:31:00,769 --> 00:30:59,039

say so while maintaining appropriate

812

00:31:02,930 --> 00:31:00,779

protections of sensitive sources and

813

00:31:05,330 --> 00:31:02,940

methods okay that I did like to see that

814

00:31:07,250 --> 00:31:05,340

word transparency in there but but at

815

00:31:09,049 --> 00:31:07,260

least give us something with it it's

816

00:31:11,990 --> 00:31:09,059

easy to type that in a report yeah

817

00:31:14,690 --> 00:31:12,000

exactly I I I'm sorry I called

818

00:31:17,269 --> 00:31:14,700

it's the the public affairs office their

819

00:31:20,389 --> 00:31:17,279

goal isn't to be transparent their goal

820

00:31:23,389 --> 00:31:20,399

is to manage the message uh so I think

821

00:31:25,490 --> 00:31:23,399

that's just a cut and paste uh

822

00:31:27,590 --> 00:31:25,500

communication strategy thing that you

823

00:31:29,630 --> 00:31:27,600

could probably find in many DOD reports

824

00:31:32,870 --> 00:31:29,640

cool good to hear that from you yeah

825

00:31:35,750 --> 00:31:32,880

that makes sense I suppose and then page

826

00:31:37,370 --> 00:31:35,760

six uh they mentioned the first time

827

00:31:39,830 --> 00:31:37,380

here about communication with Allied

828

00:31:41,690 --> 00:31:39,840

Partners regarding UAP now we've not

829

00:31:44,330 --> 00:31:41,700

really heard that much we did hear a bit

830

00:31:46,190 --> 00:31:44,340

out of Canada towards kind of well last

831

00:31:48,289 --> 00:31:46,200

year there was a few conversations we

832

00:31:49,430 --> 00:31:48,299

know that had and I think am I writing

833

00:31:51,889 --> 00:31:49,440

saying that

834

00:31:53,510 --> 00:31:51,899

there were briefings held between I

835

00:31:55,610 --> 00:31:53,520

don't think it was Kirkpatrick it might

836

00:31:57,769 --> 00:31:55,620

have been someone before him do you know

837

00:31:59,630 --> 00:31:57,779

about that Chris at all can you confirm

838

00:32:02,810 --> 00:31:59,640

that and I'm sure there was a briefing

839

00:32:05,570 --> 00:32:02,820

between whoever was running the UFO

840

00:32:07,610 --> 00:32:05,580

sorry the UAP office last year it might

841

00:32:09,049 --> 00:32:07,620

have been aim SOG I'm not sure

842

00:32:12,769 --> 00:32:09,059

Chris do you know anything about that

843

00:32:15,289 --> 00:32:12,779

yeah from my understanding it was um

844

00:32:17,510 --> 00:32:15,299

uh yeah it was reported that there had

845

00:32:20,029 --> 00:32:17,520

been a briefly briefing

846

00:32:23,750 --> 00:32:20,039

um that took place with Canada's

847

00:32:28,310 --> 00:32:23,760

um mod on the topic from understanding

848

00:32:29,630 --> 00:32:28,320

and that was confirmed by Susan Goff as

849

00:32:31,669 --> 00:32:29,640

well

850

00:32:34,490 --> 00:32:31,679

um so so that has taken place I mean

851
00:32:37,610 --> 00:32:34,500
this is a really really vital question

852
00:32:40,850 --> 00:32:37,620
in terms of what topic let's say in

853
00:32:43,909 --> 00:32:40,860
terms of collaborating with allies and

854
00:32:45,409 --> 00:32:43,919
partners is so vital because I mean just

855
00:32:49,130 --> 00:32:45,419
keep that port in your head but let's

856
00:32:52,310 --> 00:32:49,140
just say there's so many theaters within

857
00:32:54,769 --> 00:32:52,320
the past 20 years that the US and its

858
00:32:57,789 --> 00:32:54,779
partners and allies have been operating

859
00:33:00,889 --> 00:32:57,799
joint kind of like um

860
00:33:03,350 --> 00:33:00,899
joint operations let's say and then LBC

861
00:33:05,269 --> 00:33:03,360
we had the Firebase Alliance as well

862
00:33:07,850 --> 00:33:05,279
where information about to say that

863
00:33:09,350 --> 00:33:07,860

mm-hmm yeah I would expect I would

864

00:33:11,810 --> 00:33:09,360

expect that it would be five eyes

865

00:33:13,669 --> 00:33:11,820

exclusively at this point

866

00:33:15,649 --> 00:33:13,679

um at least formally speaking I'm sure

867

00:33:16,610 --> 00:33:15,659

there are small side conversations that

868

00:33:17,810 --> 00:33:16,620

happen

869

00:33:19,490 --> 00:33:17,820

um but and for those of you who aren't

870

00:33:20,930 --> 00:33:19,500

familiar with five eyes it's basically

871

00:33:23,930 --> 00:33:20,940

the closest

872

00:33:25,909 --> 00:33:23,940

um uh information and intelligence

873

00:33:28,549 --> 00:33:25,919

sharing agreement we have it it's it's

874

00:33:31,430 --> 00:33:28,559

for the five basically majority

875

00:33:34,310 --> 00:33:31,440

English-speaking countries the US UK

876

00:33:36,049 --> 00:33:34,320

Canada New Zealand Australia I'm not

877

00:33:37,430 --> 00:33:36,059

missing yeah it's fine that's it yeah I

878

00:33:38,930 --> 00:33:37,440

know that's it

879

00:33:40,310 --> 00:33:38,940

um so that's what you would expect is

880

00:33:42,169 --> 00:33:40,320

that most of the intelligence will be

881

00:33:44,090 --> 00:33:42,179

shared with those countries that we have

882

00:33:46,190 --> 00:33:44,100

our closest relationship with in terms

883

00:33:48,289 --> 00:33:46,200

of intelligence yeah and when you know

884

00:33:49,610 --> 00:33:48,299

after we we mentioned Canada but then

885

00:33:50,990 --> 00:33:49,620

you know you look to the UK and there's

886

00:33:53,630 --> 00:33:51,000

no conversation Happening Here

887

00:33:55,850 --> 00:33:53,640

whatsoever New Zealand again very quiet

888

00:33:58,009 --> 00:33:55,860

I mean in Australia it's been good to

889

00:34:00,590 --> 00:33:58,019

see Senator Peter wish Wilson kind of

890

00:34:02,870 --> 00:34:00,600

pushing uh the conversation out there

891

00:34:04,549 --> 00:34:02,880

he's not got a lot out of them but it's

892

00:34:06,470 --> 00:34:04,559

good to see someone in

893

00:34:07,909 --> 00:34:06,480

um you know with his authority trying to

894

00:34:10,310 --> 00:34:07,919

have the conversation and I think we

895

00:34:12,349 --> 00:34:10,320

need that more here in the UK about

896

00:34:14,510 --> 00:34:12,359

everywhere but you know at least they've

897

00:34:17,389 --> 00:34:14,520

got something someone doing positive

898

00:34:19,730 --> 00:34:17,399

stuff in Australia so yeah that's

899

00:34:21,169 --> 00:34:19,740

interesting uh then finally I'm here

900

00:34:22,849 --> 00:34:21,179

we're talking about the flight safety

901
00:34:24,950 --> 00:34:22,859
concern turns which I think are obvious

902
00:34:27,230 --> 00:34:24,960
to anybody who's been following this

903
00:34:28,849 --> 00:34:27,240
subject now and and heard of the work

904
00:34:31,849 --> 00:34:28,859
that Ryan Graves has been doing on that

905
00:34:34,909 --> 00:34:31,859
that aspect of uh UAP but then this bit

906
00:34:36,530 --> 00:34:34,919
at the bottom where you know there have

907
00:34:38,570 --> 00:34:36,540
been no encounters confirmed to

908
00:34:40,909 --> 00:34:38,580
contribute directly to adverse health

909
00:34:42,829 --> 00:34:40,919
related effects

910
00:34:45,470 --> 00:34:42,839
um which okay I mean a lot of these

911
00:34:49,730 --> 00:34:45,480
cases were just from the year but I mean

912
00:34:56,149 --> 00:34:53,530
yeah Chris I'll let you go first

913
00:34:58,510 --> 00:34:56,159

yeah yeah so the key word being here

914

00:35:01,070 --> 00:34:58,520

enough qualifier direct

915

00:35:06,890 --> 00:35:01,080

and confirmed

916

00:35:08,510 --> 00:35:06,900

um it's yeah it's very very it's meant

917

00:35:10,670 --> 00:35:08,520

to be like that it's it's phrased like

918

00:35:12,589 --> 00:35:10,680

that for a good reason but I mean I

919

00:35:14,030 --> 00:35:12,599

think Lila zondo

920

00:35:16,609 --> 00:35:14,040

um suggested that

921

00:35:18,230 --> 00:35:16,619

Health implications where that

922

00:35:20,630 --> 00:35:18,240

um Pilots were aviated they were

923

00:35:22,730 --> 00:35:20,640

aviators would be up in the sky

924

00:35:26,470 --> 00:35:22,740

um there would be

925

00:35:29,450 --> 00:35:26,480

lost time events so where

926

00:35:30,950 --> 00:35:29,460

they would um they would like lose a

927

00:35:32,990 --> 00:35:30,960

minute or something in the sky and they

928

00:35:35,990 --> 00:35:33,000

wouldn't know where that time went

929

00:35:38,569 --> 00:35:36,000

um and it would be because I think it

930

00:35:41,990 --> 00:35:38,579

would be like okay I burn

931

00:35:43,430 --> 00:35:42,000

through no it's one minute forward but I

932

00:35:44,690 --> 00:35:43,440

burnt I haven't burnt through that much

933

00:35:47,510 --> 00:35:44,700

fuel or something like that some

934

00:35:50,030 --> 00:35:47,520

discrepancy between the time and the

935

00:35:52,310 --> 00:35:50,040

fuel that they had been and that led

936

00:35:53,990 --> 00:35:52,320

some they were aviators to believe that

937

00:35:55,250 --> 00:35:54,000

they had lost track of time and then

938

00:36:00,890 --> 00:35:55,260

there was

939

00:36:03,170 --> 00:36:00,900

as well that was reported by some Navy

940

00:36:05,450 --> 00:36:03,180

Naval aviators

941

00:36:10,370 --> 00:36:05,460

um which I think related to

942

00:36:12,230 --> 00:36:10,380

um to to incidents involving UAP

943

00:36:15,589 --> 00:36:12,240

um and possible microwave damage as well

944

00:36:16,670 --> 00:36:15,599

so I think those would be the things

945

00:36:20,569 --> 00:36:16,680

um I could

946

00:36:22,790 --> 00:36:20,579

be Health implications from UAP

947

00:36:25,370 --> 00:36:22,800

um yeah it's very interestingly word it

948

00:36:26,810 --> 00:36:25,380

definitely it's it's something to look

949

00:36:28,730 --> 00:36:26,820

out for in the future and I'm hoping

950

00:36:31,010 --> 00:36:28,740

that as more progress has been is being

951
00:36:33,410 --> 00:36:31,020
made on this topic and arrow gets its

952
00:36:36,050 --> 00:36:33,420
act together that we can get some more

953
00:36:38,450 --> 00:36:36,060
definitive conclusions on this

954
00:36:40,550 --> 00:36:38,460
absolutely and you know I I think those

955
00:36:41,329 --> 00:36:40,560
two words are what stuck out to me as

956
00:36:43,010 --> 00:36:41,339
well

957
00:36:46,130 --> 00:36:43,020
um putting my epidemiologist hat on

958
00:36:48,730 --> 00:36:46,140
though I also it was a little irritated

959
00:36:52,030 --> 00:36:48,740
because what we really need is we need

960
00:36:54,410 --> 00:36:52,040
epidemiologists to study this for

961
00:36:57,349 --> 00:36:54,420
decades because what we see a lot of

962
00:37:00,109 --> 00:36:57,359
times as the type of exposures that uh

963
00:37:01,670 --> 00:37:00,119

UAP experiencers have are typically in

964

00:37:02,930 --> 00:37:01,680

the radiation

965

00:37:06,650 --> 00:37:02,940

um

966

00:37:09,849 --> 00:37:06,660

symptomology and we know for a fact well

967

00:37:12,890 --> 00:37:09,859

we know based on anecdotes that

968

00:37:15,109 --> 00:37:12,900

experiencers have high amounts of

969

00:37:17,150 --> 00:37:15,119

autoimmune and cancer clustering these

970

00:37:19,910 --> 00:37:17,160

are changes that happen over years

971

00:37:22,490 --> 00:37:19,920

decades even and so I think what we need

972

00:37:25,130 --> 00:37:22,500

to do is really make sure that for folks

973

00:37:27,530 --> 00:37:25,140

who are having these encounters we're

974

00:37:29,810 --> 00:37:27,540

following their records

975

00:37:32,089 --> 00:37:29,820

um for a while and that's not a cheap

976
00:37:34,190 --> 00:37:32,099
thing to do and it probably won't happen

977
00:37:35,690 --> 00:37:34,200
but if we're really serious about

978
00:37:37,910 --> 00:37:35,700
looking into this that's what we would

979
00:37:40,310 --> 00:37:37,920
look at because it's just impossible to

980
00:37:41,990 --> 00:37:40,320
say at the exact time whether or not

981
00:37:44,510 --> 00:37:42,000
there was any impact to human health

982
00:37:46,250 --> 00:37:44,520
there's a lot of cellular changes that

983
00:37:48,829 --> 00:37:46,260
could happen that we're not going to see

984
00:37:51,050 --> 00:37:48,839
immediately it's really important as

985
00:37:52,310 --> 00:37:51,060
well for Pilots near wavy eaters and

986
00:37:54,829 --> 00:37:52,320
their families to understand what

987
00:37:58,130 --> 00:37:54,839
they're getting into when they sign up

988
00:38:00,470 --> 00:37:58,140

to to serve their country I I feel

989

00:38:01,910 --> 00:38:00,480

um you know you look back on decades ago

990

00:38:03,290 --> 00:38:01,920

when the nuclear tests were being

991

00:38:06,530 --> 00:38:03,300

carried out and

992

00:38:08,990 --> 00:38:06,540

now you've got lots of um people who

993

00:38:11,750 --> 00:38:09,000

took part in those tests and they've got

994

00:38:14,150 --> 00:38:11,760

horrible diseases from it

995

00:38:16,430 --> 00:38:14,160

um and at the time the risks weren't

996

00:38:18,470 --> 00:38:16,440

made clear and that seen as a scandal

997

00:38:20,210 --> 00:38:18,480

and I think that we could potentially

998

00:38:22,550 --> 00:38:20,220

see something similar if it is found

999

00:38:24,710 --> 00:38:22,560

conclusive that there are health related

1000

00:38:26,870 --> 00:38:24,720

impacts from UAP

1001

00:38:28,970 --> 00:38:26,880

yeah absolutely I appreciate you both

1002

00:38:29,930 --> 00:38:28,980

talking about that I mean we only have

1003

00:38:31,910 --> 00:38:29,940

to look at what happened with John

1004

00:38:34,130 --> 00:38:31,920

Burris following rendersham the amount

1005

00:38:36,109 --> 00:38:34,140

of years and decades he had trying to

1006

00:38:38,150 --> 00:38:36,119

get his medical records and some kind of

1007

00:38:39,349 --> 00:38:38,160

reimbursement through you know as a

1008

00:38:41,030 --> 00:38:39,359

veteran so

1009

00:38:43,010 --> 00:38:41,040

yeah it'd be interesting to see how that

1010

00:38:46,250 --> 00:38:43,020

develops in any more future reports and

1011

00:38:48,470 --> 00:38:46,260

the work that Arrow are doing so yeah so

1012

00:38:50,089 --> 00:38:48,480

moving on to the summary here I mean the

1013

00:38:52,490 --> 00:38:50,099

first line stating about the hazard to

1014

00:38:54,589 --> 00:38:52,500

flight safety I like how they put a pose

1015

00:38:56,630 --> 00:38:54,599

pose a possible adversary collection

1016

00:38:58,010 --> 00:38:56,640

threat because people still see that

1017

00:38:59,210 --> 00:38:58,020

word threat and they still don't

1018

00:39:01,550 --> 00:38:59,220

understand that we're not talking about

1019

00:39:05,210 --> 00:39:01,560

an alien invasion here we're still

1020

00:39:08,569 --> 00:39:05,220

talking about defense and the Department

1021

00:39:10,430 --> 00:39:08,579

of Defense doing their job by you know

1022

00:39:12,470 --> 00:39:10,440

you can't just assume that these things

1023

00:39:14,569 --> 00:39:12,480

they're not a threat we're the threat to

1024

00:39:16,510 --> 00:39:14,579

humanity you know we've got to get past

1025

00:39:19,550 --> 00:39:16,520

that so that's good to see that it was

1026

00:39:21,109 --> 00:39:19,560

defined a bit better

1027

00:39:22,849 --> 00:39:21,119

um but they're saying as well that you

1028

00:39:25,390 --> 00:39:22,859

know the reporting is due to the dis

1029

00:39:28,550 --> 00:39:25,400

because the efforts trying to destigmat

1030

00:39:30,230 --> 00:39:28,560

stigmatize the topic okay that's good to

1031

00:39:30,950 --> 00:39:30,240

hear as well

1032

00:39:33,170 --> 00:39:30,960

um

1033

00:39:34,550 --> 00:39:33,180

yeah if any of you guys can pull

1034

00:39:37,550 --> 00:39:34,560

anything out of there that you think is

1035

00:39:40,190 --> 00:39:37,560

worth mentioning uh I see at the bottom

1036

00:39:41,990 --> 00:39:40,200

the coordinated coordinated efforts it

1037

00:39:45,050 --> 00:39:42,000

does from the the wording in the last

1038

00:39:47,870 --> 00:39:45,060

paragraph sound like they're starting to

1039

00:39:49,730 --> 00:39:47,880

identify the solutions going forward the

1040

00:39:52,790 --> 00:39:49,740

procedures and processes it doesn't

1041

00:39:54,950 --> 00:39:52,800

sound like they are you know established

1042

00:39:55,730 --> 00:39:54,960

in any way so it'll be interesting to

1043

00:39:57,650 --> 00:39:55,740

see

1044

00:40:00,109 --> 00:39:57,660

come the end of June I believe when we

1045

00:40:01,190 --> 00:40:00,119

are likely to get another report Vinnie

1046

00:40:03,349 --> 00:40:01,200

are you expecting the federal government

1047

00:40:05,810 --> 00:40:03,359

to work quickly because I got news for

1048

00:40:10,250 --> 00:40:08,630

uh no I just real quick you pointed out

1049

00:40:12,349 --> 00:40:10,260

that posing the possible adversary

1050

00:40:14,569 --> 00:40:12,359

collection threat I don't know exactly

1051
00:40:18,109 --> 00:40:14,579
what was meant by that but I would say

1052
00:40:20,630 --> 00:40:18,119
that I I kind of inferred that pop

1053
00:40:22,609 --> 00:40:20,640
perhaps they're concerned about our

1054
00:40:24,890 --> 00:40:22,619
adversaries getting their hands on this

1055
00:40:27,589 --> 00:40:24,900
technology and the technological

1056
00:40:29,750 --> 00:40:27,599
disadvantage that would put us at

1057
00:40:30,470 --> 00:40:29,760
um not a not a happy thing to think

1058
00:40:32,569 --> 00:40:30,480
about

1059
00:40:34,849 --> 00:40:32,579
um but that is definitely what hurts my

1060
00:40:36,829 --> 00:40:34,859
ear up I think is what I got from that

1061
00:40:38,990 --> 00:40:36,839
the possible adversary collection is

1062
00:40:40,849 --> 00:40:39,000
could these could they be just thinking

1063
00:40:43,970 --> 00:40:40,859

about drones over nuclear facilities

1064

00:40:46,609 --> 00:40:43,980

collecting data on our systems and

1065

00:40:48,470 --> 00:40:46,619

capabilities maybe absolutely

1066

00:40:50,150 --> 00:40:48,480

interesting how it can be looked at

1067

00:40:52,210 --> 00:40:50,160

differently they love this vague

1068

00:40:54,589 --> 00:40:52,220

language don't they

1069

00:40:55,910 --> 00:40:54,599

Chris anything you could kind of glean

1070

00:40:58,910 --> 00:40:55,920

from that at all

1071

00:41:00,410 --> 00:40:58,920

yeah yeah I would like to think that

1072

00:41:03,410 --> 00:41:00,420

China

1073

00:41:06,530 --> 00:41:03,420

or Russia hasn't consistently in

1074

00:41:08,810 --> 00:41:06,540

constantly throughout the past maybe

1075

00:41:10,790 --> 00:41:08,820

perhaps 10 years and going on to this

1076

00:41:13,089 --> 00:41:10,800

day probably still

1077

00:41:15,650 --> 00:41:13,099

um on the East Coast being sending

1078

00:41:17,510 --> 00:41:15,660

drones or balloons whatever on the east

1079

00:41:21,770 --> 00:41:17,520

coast to spy on

1080

00:41:24,349 --> 00:41:21,780

um U.S Navy Naval aviators conducting

1081

00:41:26,150 --> 00:41:24,359

um conducting training missions and I'd

1082

00:41:29,329 --> 00:41:26,160

like to think that that hasn't been

1083

00:41:31,490 --> 00:41:29,339

happening so long and that still despite

1084

00:41:33,589 --> 00:41:31,500

all this and despite Ryan Gray's coming

1085

00:41:36,849 --> 00:41:33,599

out in 60 minutes that this is

1086

00:41:39,710 --> 00:41:36,859

continuing to happen despite it being

1087

00:41:42,829 --> 00:41:39,720

adverse through you know adversaries

1088

00:41:44,390 --> 00:41:42,839

perhaps spying on us I mean to think

1089

00:41:46,790 --> 00:41:44,400

that something would have been done by

1090

00:41:49,430 --> 00:41:46,800

now if it was just simple you know

1091

00:41:52,730 --> 00:41:49,440

balloons or drones

1092

00:41:54,650 --> 00:41:52,740

um doing that and um to my knowledge

1093

00:41:56,870 --> 00:41:54,660

um from from what's being made public

1094

00:41:59,750 --> 00:41:56,880

Naval aviators aren't aware that it's

1095

00:42:01,609 --> 00:41:59,760

Chinese or Russian as well so yeah

1096

00:42:03,109 --> 00:42:01,619

that's really important I think you know

1097

00:42:04,849 --> 00:42:03,119

as well I'd like to say that I was

1098

00:42:07,490 --> 00:42:04,859

disgusting it was a very very bright

1099

00:42:11,510 --> 00:42:07,500

person the other day about

1100

00:42:17,390 --> 00:42:11,520

this other angle that China and other

1101

00:42:18,950 --> 00:42:17,400

nations may may be looking into

1102

00:42:21,410 --> 00:42:18,960

um their own kind of like crash

1103

00:42:23,450 --> 00:42:21,420

retrievals let's say if any other

1104

00:42:26,270 --> 00:42:23,460

countries have

1105

00:42:30,109 --> 00:42:26,280

alleged craft

1106

00:42:32,510 --> 00:42:30,119

then that is definitely a threat

1107

00:42:34,430 --> 00:42:32,520

um because I mean whoever gets this

1108

00:42:37,490 --> 00:42:34,440

technology first kind of like rules the

1109

00:42:40,609 --> 00:42:37,500

world basically and China for instance

1110

00:42:42,890 --> 00:42:40,619

has the world's largest UFO organization

1111

00:42:43,870 --> 00:42:42,900

it's like one million over one million

1112

00:42:47,089 --> 00:42:43,880

members

1113

00:42:49,790 --> 00:42:47,099

and each one of them has to have like a

1114

00:42:52,250 --> 00:42:49,800

degree and have a written paper so these

1115

00:42:54,770 --> 00:42:52,260

are highly qualified people and the

1116

00:42:56,870 --> 00:42:54,780

stigma is not as big in China they just

1117

00:43:00,650 --> 00:42:56,880

want to look at the data and look at the

1118

00:43:01,370 --> 00:43:00,660

raw facts and also in China as well and

1119

00:43:04,010 --> 00:43:01,380

um

1120

00:43:05,510 --> 00:43:04,020

I guess not so much Russia considering

1121

00:43:07,910 --> 00:43:05,520

what's happened in the intelligence

1122

00:43:09,950 --> 00:43:07,920

front but in China they're able to keep

1123

00:43:11,990 --> 00:43:09,960

things very very tight in terms of

1124

00:43:13,970 --> 00:43:12,000

secrecy as well so you could possibly

1125

00:43:16,010 --> 00:43:13,980

have a huge number of people looking

1126

00:43:19,790 --> 00:43:16,020

into possible

1127

00:43:21,589 --> 00:43:19,800

um craft and studying it and that kind

1128

00:43:23,450 --> 00:43:21,599

of being kept

1129

00:43:26,470 --> 00:43:23,460

um Loctite and

1130

00:43:30,170 --> 00:43:26,480

if that is true that there are you know

1131

00:43:32,750 --> 00:43:30,180

craft of possible alien origin and the

1132

00:43:35,390 --> 00:43:32,760

Us and other nations have that

1133

00:43:38,750 --> 00:43:35,400

have these Craft

1134

00:43:41,390 --> 00:43:38,760

um then China perhaps has a real real

1135

00:43:44,150 --> 00:43:41,400

um Edge on everyone else

1136

00:43:45,950 --> 00:43:44,160

yeah I you're completely right Chris and

1137

00:43:47,210 --> 00:43:45,960

I I think one of the biggest arguments

1138

00:43:49,130 --> 00:43:47,220

against

1139

00:43:50,809 --> 00:43:49,140

um the majority of these reports being

1140

00:43:54,530 --> 00:43:50,819

Russian attack is the Ukraine war first

1141

00:43:56,809 --> 00:43:54,540

of all uh if you can't get a tank across

1142

00:43:59,270 --> 00:43:56,819

a creek then I highly doubt you're

1143

00:44:00,710 --> 00:43:59,280

shooting down UFOs and have your own

1144

00:44:01,250 --> 00:44:00,720

technology

1145

00:44:03,710 --> 00:44:01,260

um

1146

00:44:05,630 --> 00:44:03,720

you know I I'm a little more cautious on

1147

00:44:08,270 --> 00:44:05,640

this I think that

1148

00:44:10,490 --> 00:44:08,280

look there's bound to be some Chinese

1149

00:44:12,530 --> 00:44:10,500

drones i i in with it within these

1150

00:44:14,390 --> 00:44:12,540

reports there really are

1151
00:44:16,790 --> 00:44:14,400
um they're rapidly expanding their

1152
00:44:18,410 --> 00:44:16,800
technological capabilities

1153
00:44:21,470 --> 00:44:18,420
um especially on the west coast I would

1154
00:44:24,349 --> 00:44:21,480
not be shocked but like you said they

1155
00:44:26,030 --> 00:44:24,359
have this huge this huge organization

1156
00:44:28,069 --> 00:44:26,040
they have

1157
00:44:30,410 --> 00:44:28,079
um a clear interest in this topic so

1158
00:44:32,750 --> 00:44:30,420
they wouldn't be investigating this

1159
00:44:34,430 --> 00:44:32,760
topic if it was all them and so I think

1160
00:44:36,950 --> 00:44:34,440
it's we have to be very careful to

1161
00:44:39,770 --> 00:44:36,960
recognize that look some of these are

1162
00:44:42,230 --> 00:44:39,780
bound to be a drone here or there that's

1163
00:44:45,230 --> 00:44:42,240

okay we expect that

1164

00:44:46,970 --> 00:44:45,240

um but arguing that all of this can be

1165

00:44:49,250 --> 00:44:46,980

explained by Foreign adversary attack or

1166

00:44:51,470 --> 00:44:49,260

black Tech maybe one or two sightings

1167

00:44:53,809 --> 00:44:51,480

are maybe there's one class of sighting

1168

00:44:55,849 --> 00:44:53,819

that is uh black Tech that doesn't mean

1169

00:44:56,870 --> 00:44:55,859

that all of it can be explained in that

1170

00:44:59,390 --> 00:44:56,880

way

1171

00:45:01,069 --> 00:44:59,400

um but yeah I personally am very

1172

00:45:03,410 --> 00:45:01,079

concerned about the Chinese government

1173

00:45:06,170 --> 00:45:03,420

and how they are are looking at this

1174

00:45:09,190 --> 00:45:06,180

topic I think it's probably our biggest

1175

00:45:13,250 --> 00:45:09,200

threat at the moment in terms of the UAP

1176

00:45:15,890 --> 00:45:13,260

discussion and I I I think what we are

1177

00:45:20,210 --> 00:45:15,900

really seeing is

1178

00:45:22,790 --> 00:45:20,220

a huge imbalance in stigma because of

1179

00:45:24,230 --> 00:45:22,800

the Robertsons panel right

1180

00:45:26,030 --> 00:45:24,240

um a lot of other countries that didn't

1181

00:45:28,250 --> 00:45:26,040

have those efforts to intentionally

1182

00:45:31,250 --> 00:45:28,260

destigmatize or intentionally stigmatize

1183

00:45:33,829 --> 00:45:31,260

the topic don't have the same Hang-Ups

1184

00:45:35,630 --> 00:45:33,839

that we have in the US and it's really

1185

00:45:38,210 --> 00:45:35,640

going to harm our national security so

1186

00:45:39,650 --> 00:45:38,220

we've got to put our pedal to the metal

1187

00:45:42,349 --> 00:45:39,660

on this

1188

00:45:44,390 --> 00:45:42,359

um or we're going to be outmaneuvered

1189

00:45:45,530 --> 00:45:44,400

yeah well said I completely agree on

1190

00:45:47,030 --> 00:45:45,540

that

1191

00:45:48,410 --> 00:45:47,040

um just looking here at page eight I

1192

00:45:52,069 --> 00:45:48,420

believe that was just what was laid out

1193

00:45:53,329 --> 00:45:52,079

in the ndaa for fiscal year 2022

1194

00:45:54,589 --> 00:45:53,339

um so we don't need to kind of pull

1195

00:45:55,910 --> 00:45:54,599

anything from that correct me if I'm

1196

00:45:58,910 --> 00:45:55,920

wrong but I'm pretty sure that's all

1197

00:45:59,990 --> 00:45:58,920

that was just in in the ndaa

1198

00:46:03,170 --> 00:46:00,000

um

1199

00:46:05,450 --> 00:46:03,180

here we go uh unclassified I think that

1200

00:46:08,630 --> 00:46:05,460

again is still the end of that I I just

1201
00:46:10,430 --> 00:46:08,640
would refer people to to the ndaa or to

1202
00:46:12,650 --> 00:46:10,440
go and look at that themselves

1203
00:46:15,950 --> 00:46:12,660
uh establishment of the office and

1204
00:46:17,750 --> 00:46:15,960
duties based again on the ndaa and and

1205
00:46:19,490 --> 00:46:17,760
what they were asking them to do and

1206
00:46:21,470 --> 00:46:19,500
develop

1207
00:46:23,450 --> 00:46:21,480
there's your key terms

1208
00:46:24,950 --> 00:46:23,460
and it's interesting that top one there

1209
00:46:26,690 --> 00:46:24,960
range Fowler and then we happen to see

1210
00:46:29,809 --> 00:46:26,700
the release of these

1211
00:46:31,970 --> 00:46:29,819
well I think was it 70 or 90 redacted

1212
00:46:34,069 --> 00:46:31,980
range Fowlers uh appear yesterday

1213
00:46:36,710 --> 00:46:34,079

including the Nimitz and stuff I found

1214

00:46:38,329 --> 00:46:36,720

that really interesting uh I had a brief

1215

00:46:40,130 --> 00:46:38,339

look and couldn't really get much

1216

00:46:43,010 --> 00:46:40,140

information out of them because of the

1217

00:46:44,690 --> 00:46:43,020

heavily redacted areas but it was it it

1218

00:46:46,609 --> 00:46:44,700

just seems that we get things like all

1219

00:46:50,270 --> 00:46:46,619

in a little bunch and things seem to

1220

00:46:51,550 --> 00:46:50,280

drop at the same time it's it's strange

1221

00:46:55,370 --> 00:46:51,560

yes

1222

00:46:57,170 --> 00:46:55,380

there we go I think that is that so

1223

00:47:00,290 --> 00:46:57,180

is there anything anyone wants to say

1224

00:47:03,170 --> 00:47:00,300

before I move on

1225

00:47:07,010 --> 00:47:03,180

yeah I would just say that

1226

00:47:11,270 --> 00:47:07,020

um just going back to the page

1227

00:47:12,849 --> 00:47:11,280

where they say page five where they say

1228

00:47:15,170 --> 00:47:12,859

that um

1229

00:47:17,770 --> 00:47:15,180

arrows initial analysis and

1230

00:47:20,089 --> 00:47:17,780

characterization of the 360 Community

1231

00:47:22,730 --> 00:47:20,099

identified reports informed by a

1232

00:47:25,010 --> 00:47:22,740

multi-agency process judge more than

1233

00:47:26,690 --> 00:47:25,020

half as exhibiting unremarkable

1234

00:47:27,650 --> 00:47:26,700

characteristics it's very very important

1235

00:47:29,990 --> 00:47:27,660

because

1236

00:47:32,630 --> 00:47:30,000

this is just initial

1237

00:47:35,089 --> 00:47:32,640

analysis and characterization as it says

1238

00:47:38,170 --> 00:47:35,099

yeah and then in the paragraph after

1239

00:47:41,450 --> 00:47:38,180

that it um

1240

00:47:44,630 --> 00:47:41,460

it basically states that um

1241

00:47:47,030 --> 00:47:44,640

oh it says it hasn't been positively

1242

00:47:49,130 --> 00:47:47,040

identified

1243

00:47:50,510 --> 00:47:49,140

um yeah positive yeah so initial

1244

00:47:53,270 --> 00:47:50,520

characterization does not mean

1245

00:47:55,130 --> 00:47:53,280

positively resolved or identified

1246

00:47:57,710 --> 00:47:55,140

so that's really really important like

1247

00:47:59,329 --> 00:47:57,720

Katie was saying before that media tend

1248

00:48:01,790 --> 00:47:59,339

to be quite lazy so they'll just say oh

1249

00:48:03,309 --> 00:48:01,800

yeah more than half of them are balloons

1250

00:48:05,930 --> 00:48:03,319

or drones

1251

00:48:09,050 --> 00:48:05,940

and stuff like that so that that's

1252

00:48:12,530 --> 00:48:09,060

really important um and I'll point back

1253

00:48:15,109 --> 00:48:12,540

to the um the case the Omaha Case of

1254

00:48:18,470 --> 00:48:15,119

West Coast that came out

1255

00:48:19,370 --> 00:48:18,480

um with the the pyramid as it's been

1256

00:48:20,030 --> 00:48:19,380

said

1257

00:48:22,250 --> 00:48:20,040

um

1258

00:48:23,150 --> 00:48:22,260

grown or UAP you have a you want to look

1259

00:48:24,349 --> 00:48:23,160

at it

1260

00:48:27,710 --> 00:48:24,359

um I think there's still a lot to be

1261

00:48:29,329 --> 00:48:27,720

said on on that case and as you would

1262

00:48:32,690 --> 00:48:29,339

remember

1263

00:48:34,670 --> 00:48:32,700

um Scott Bray and the dod have stated

1264

00:48:37,309 --> 00:48:34,680

that these things are

1265

00:48:39,950 --> 00:48:37,319

um unmanned aircraft systems

1266

00:48:41,030 --> 00:48:39,960

so I want to ask a question I have asked

1267

00:48:43,430 --> 00:48:41,040

a question

1268

00:48:45,950 --> 00:48:43,440

was this just an initial analysis and

1269

00:48:49,670 --> 00:48:45,960

characterization of this case and has it

1270

00:48:51,470 --> 00:48:49,680

been positively resolved or identified I

1271

00:48:54,230 --> 00:48:51,480

think that's very very important I mean

1272

00:48:55,849 --> 00:48:54,240

if it is China and you don't know where

1273

00:48:58,730 --> 00:48:55,859

it came from

1274

00:49:00,470 --> 00:48:58,740

and you've not managed to

1275

00:49:02,210 --> 00:49:00,480

um fight you know you've not managed to

1276

00:49:03,230 --> 00:49:02,220

find the original and prove that it's

1277

00:49:05,690 --> 00:49:03,240

Chinese

1278

00:49:07,609 --> 00:49:05,700

that's really really bad and if it was a

1279

00:49:10,670 --> 00:49:07,619

Chinese this looks like really really

1280

00:49:12,890 --> 00:49:10,680

next gen technology especially if the US

1281

00:49:14,150 --> 00:49:12,900

can't explain it

1282

00:49:16,790 --> 00:49:14,160

um to start off with I mean it's only

1283

00:49:19,430 --> 00:49:16,800

recently they've said it it's uas and we

1284

00:49:21,890 --> 00:49:19,440

don't Nerf that Stephanie uas or not but

1285

00:49:24,050 --> 00:49:21,900

if it was their technology why would

1286

00:49:28,329 --> 00:49:24,060

they be flaunting it around the US

1287

00:49:31,010 --> 00:49:28,339

fleets so that it could be shot down

1288

00:49:32,210 --> 00:49:31,020

a lot of stuff still doesn't make sense

1289

00:49:34,190 --> 00:49:32,220

to me

1290

00:49:36,050 --> 00:49:34,200

I mean that's the tagline for this whole

1291

00:49:38,329 --> 00:49:36,060

this whole discussion right and lots of

1292

00:49:39,829 --> 00:49:38,339

ones that make sense I I think that if I

1293

00:49:42,770 --> 00:49:39,839

was a professional staffer right now

1294

00:49:45,050 --> 00:49:42,780

looking at this I would see the number

1295

00:49:47,569 --> 00:49:45,060

of reports in a single year and I would

1296

00:49:50,510 --> 00:49:47,579

say there is no way they have enough

1297

00:49:52,550 --> 00:49:50,520

resources to adequately investigate

1298

00:49:55,130 --> 00:49:52,560

these cases because the positively

1299

00:49:56,569 --> 00:49:55,140

identified caveat I think is really

1300

00:49:58,670 --> 00:49:56,579

interesting for us because we're like oh

1301
00:50:00,230 --> 00:49:58,680
great they're not done but in

1302
00:50:01,849 --> 00:50:00,240
practicality what that means is they're

1303
00:50:04,609 --> 00:50:01,859
putting that on a shelf because they

1304
00:50:08,089 --> 00:50:04,619
don't have the manpower to investigate

1305
00:50:09,829 --> 00:50:08,099
every single case to its conclusion

1306
00:50:12,530 --> 00:50:09,839
right I mean if you're looking at 500

1307
00:50:14,809 --> 00:50:12,540
some odd cases a year you're talking

1308
00:50:16,670 --> 00:50:14,819
about multiple cases a day are you

1309
00:50:18,410 --> 00:50:16,680
telling me that in a couple hours

1310
00:50:20,569 --> 00:50:18,420
they're solving some of these really

1311
00:50:21,890 --> 00:50:20,579
difficult cases no way and so what

1312
00:50:24,349 --> 00:50:21,900
they're doing is they're putting them

1313
00:50:26,089 --> 00:50:24,359

into a bucket and saying okay we think

1314

00:50:27,650 --> 00:50:26,099

we know what these are we can't say for

1315

00:50:29,630 --> 00:50:27,660

sure but we really need to focus on

1316

00:50:31,910 --> 00:50:29,640

these ones that are really obvious and

1317

00:50:34,550 --> 00:50:31,920

interesting and in that process we could

1318

00:50:36,470 --> 00:50:34,560

be missing a lot of information and so

1319

00:50:38,630 --> 00:50:36,480

what I really see with this is the need

1320

00:50:40,250 --> 00:50:38,640

for better Appropriations better

1321

00:50:42,530 --> 00:50:40,260

Manpower

1322

00:50:43,609 --> 00:50:42,540

um expanded scope of authority if they

1323

00:50:47,270 --> 00:50:43,619

show that they're doing their job

1324

00:50:51,170 --> 00:50:47,280

diligently and um honestly and so if I

1325

00:50:53,569 --> 00:50:51,180

was Arrow I would be clamoring telling

1326

00:50:55,430 --> 00:50:53,579

Congress give me more money give me more

1327

00:50:57,410 --> 00:50:55,440

stuff let us investigate this well

1328

00:50:59,870 --> 00:50:57,420

because this should be something that

1329

00:51:01,069 --> 00:50:59,880

every defense official wants to expand

1330

00:51:04,549 --> 00:51:01,079

my office

1331

00:51:07,130 --> 00:51:04,559

and so I I hope that's what happened but

1332

00:51:08,930 --> 00:51:07,140

you know if the goal isn't actually to

1333

00:51:11,569 --> 00:51:08,940

be transparent and solve this that'll

1334

00:51:13,190 --> 00:51:11,579

become very obvious because any

1335

00:51:18,049 --> 00:51:13,200

intelligence officer would look at this

1336

00:51:21,290 --> 00:51:18,059

and go we need better better analysis

1337

00:51:23,390 --> 00:51:21,300

here here yep very very good very good

1338

00:51:24,829 --> 00:51:23,400

point uh before we move on to the

1339

00:51:27,230 --> 00:51:24,839

slideshow I'm just going to read out a

1340

00:51:29,450 --> 00:51:27,240

couple of comments questions that I've

1341

00:51:31,609 --> 00:51:29,460

collated from the live chat first up

1342

00:51:33,470 --> 00:51:31,619

Jonathan Davis says I'd ignore this

1343

00:51:34,910 --> 00:51:33,480

report the next one is the first chance

1344

00:51:37,250 --> 00:51:34,920

we get to see what this team will

1345

00:51:39,950 --> 00:51:37,260

produce based on the new more powerful

1346

00:51:41,510 --> 00:51:39,960

Congressional requirements absolutely I

1347

00:51:43,609 --> 00:51:41,520

think that that that's really going to

1348

00:51:45,950 --> 00:51:43,619

be the test isn't it

1349

00:51:48,829 --> 00:51:45,960

um Lord bass says do you do you think

1350

00:51:52,190 --> 00:51:48,839

they would admit if it were adversary

1351
00:51:55,250 --> 00:51:52,200
probably not not publicly no because

1352
00:51:57,770 --> 00:51:55,260
that would say we can't control what's

1353
00:52:00,710 --> 00:51:57,780
in us guys we are not that good at

1354
00:52:04,549 --> 00:52:00,720
defending the country uh

1355
00:52:07,010 --> 00:52:04,559
yeah that's uh interesting uh next up

1356
00:52:08,870 --> 00:52:07,020
Susan goff's time traveling agent says

1357
00:52:11,690 --> 00:52:08,880
has there been any information released

1358
00:52:13,790 --> 00:52:11,700
on how long the classified report is no

1359
00:52:16,190 --> 00:52:13,800
I have not heard how long it is I've had

1360
00:52:17,650 --> 00:52:16,200
a few conversations but not about the

1361
00:52:22,190 --> 00:52:17,660
length

1362
00:52:24,290 --> 00:52:22,200
yes according to the sources that Josh

1363
00:52:27,349 --> 00:52:24,300

my memory is correct I think it was

1364

00:52:32,270 --> 00:52:27,359

double at least double in terms of pages

1365

00:52:36,890 --> 00:52:34,430

interesting I need to have a look back

1366

00:52:39,109 --> 00:52:36,900

at that and circle around but I think

1367

00:52:40,970 --> 00:52:39,119

uh Susan gough's time traveling agents

1368

00:52:42,290 --> 00:52:40,980

thank you for the kind donation yep hit

1369

00:52:43,790 --> 00:52:42,300

that like button and spread the news

1370

00:52:46,549 --> 00:52:43,800

indeed people

1371

00:52:48,829 --> 00:52:46,559

and finally Echoes In loaf I says is the

1372

00:52:51,589 --> 00:52:48,839

US defense Bill properly scrutinized or

1373

00:52:53,329 --> 00:52:51,599

investigated as the nuts and bolts the

1374

00:52:55,130 --> 00:52:53,339

way I see it is that there is funding

1375

00:52:57,230 --> 00:52:55,140

going to certain groups who have all the

1376

00:52:59,450 --> 00:52:57,240

answers

1377

00:53:01,970 --> 00:52:59,460

uh well first of all I would say the the

1378

00:53:03,829 --> 00:53:01,980

ndaa doesn't allocate funding so that's

1379

00:53:06,410 --> 00:53:03,839

an authorizations bill

1380

00:53:07,910 --> 00:53:06,420

um so that just allows these offices

1381

00:53:11,569 --> 00:53:07,920

um and

1382

00:53:13,250 --> 00:53:11,579

um uh programs to exist we need to look

1383

00:53:15,049 --> 00:53:13,260

at the Appropriations Bill and see how

1384

00:53:17,750 --> 00:53:15,059

much they're actually going to be given

1385

00:53:20,030 --> 00:53:17,760

to carry this out a very common trick in

1386

00:53:22,130 --> 00:53:20,040

Washington is to say sure we'll start

1387

00:53:24,230 --> 00:53:22,140

this office and then we'll give you two

1388

00:53:25,370 --> 00:53:24,240

million dollars to do it

1389

00:53:27,170 --> 00:53:25,380

um and that would be really really

1390

00:53:28,490 --> 00:53:27,180

obvious so that's what I would pay

1391

00:53:30,109 --> 00:53:28,500

attention to

1392

00:53:32,089 --> 00:53:30,119

excellent

1393

00:53:34,430 --> 00:53:32,099

right before we do move on I am just

1394

00:53:36,170 --> 00:53:34,440

going to quickly read out Lou Lou's Lou

1395

00:53:37,910 --> 00:53:36,180

Alexander was kind enough to give me a

1396

00:53:40,970 --> 00:53:37,920

quote regarding

1397

00:53:43,309 --> 00:53:40,980

uh I guess his views on on the UAP

1398

00:53:47,030 --> 00:53:43,319

report so let me just bring that over so

1399

00:53:49,309 --> 00:53:47,040

thank you I know it's I I Lou is always

1400

00:53:51,470 --> 00:53:49,319

very generous with his time and uh

1401
00:53:53,690 --> 00:53:51,480
providing me with uh you know short

1402
00:53:56,270 --> 00:53:53,700
videos or quotes so yeah I really

1403
00:53:57,530 --> 00:53:56,280
appreciate it so Lou says first of all I

1404
00:53:58,910 --> 00:53:57,540
would like to extend a thank you to

1405
00:54:00,650 --> 00:53:58,920
Vinnie and Chris for their tireless

1406
00:54:03,230 --> 00:54:00,660
efforts involving this topic over the

1407
00:54:04,549 --> 00:54:03,240
past few years thank you and of course a

1408
00:54:05,809 --> 00:54:04,559
big thank you to your audience who

1409
00:54:08,030 --> 00:54:05,819
continue to put pressure on our

1410
00:54:10,730 --> 00:54:08,040
government to pursue this issue people

1411
00:54:12,589 --> 00:54:10,740
in high places are listening this report

1412
00:54:15,589 --> 00:54:12,599
is yet another incremental step forward

1413
00:54:17,650 --> 00:54:15,599

towards real transparency from 144

1414

00:54:19,970 --> 00:54:17,660

unknown events to now over 500

1415

00:54:22,549 --> 00:54:19,980

personally I expect this trend to only

1416

00:54:24,530 --> 00:54:22,559

increase with time we must also remain

1417

00:54:26,150 --> 00:54:24,540

Vigilant and remind ourselves of what

1418

00:54:28,010 --> 00:54:26,160

Chris Mellon said in his most recent

1419

00:54:30,290 --> 00:54:28,020

article the more we look up the more

1420

00:54:33,470 --> 00:54:30,300

things we are going to see some will

1421

00:54:34,970 --> 00:54:33,480

have prosaic explanations some won't it

1422

00:54:36,290 --> 00:54:34,980

is these that remain completely out of

1423

00:54:38,630 --> 00:54:36,300

the realm of our current technology

1424

00:54:40,190 --> 00:54:38,640

Paradigm that we must focus on and not

1425

00:54:42,290 --> 00:54:40,200

allow ourselves the temptation of

1426

00:54:45,109 --> 00:54:42,300

writing off the truly unexamined as

1427

00:54:47,750 --> 00:54:45,119

simply a mirage or atmospheric anomaly I

1428

00:54:49,390 --> 00:54:47,760

trust our Pilots to win our Wars I also

1429

00:54:51,890 --> 00:54:49,400

trust our Pilots to tell the truth

1430

00:54:53,510 --> 00:54:51,900

lastly I trust our Pilots know the

1431

00:54:57,609 --> 00:54:53,520

difference between a seagull and

1432

00:55:02,569 --> 00:55:00,890

amazing thank you Lou so much so yeah

1433

00:55:04,130 --> 00:55:02,579

it's good to always get a statement from

1434

00:55:05,030 --> 00:55:04,140

Lou on his thoughts on what's Happening

1435

00:55:06,490 --> 00:55:05,040

so

1436

00:55:10,790 --> 00:55:06,500

yeah

1437

00:55:12,290 --> 00:55:10,800

that's great uh right so you know one

1438

00:55:13,609 --> 00:55:12,300

thing I will say as well is that the

1439

00:55:14,990 --> 00:55:13,619

Chris mellon's article was really

1440

00:55:16,849 --> 00:55:15,000

interesting pulling out his key

1441

00:55:18,410 --> 00:55:16,859

takeaways that is linked in the

1442

00:55:20,210 --> 00:55:18,420

description for people to go and take a

1443

00:55:21,650 --> 00:55:20,220

look at as well as the couple of the

1444

00:55:24,470 --> 00:55:21,660

videos that have cropped up with John

1445

00:55:26,390 --> 00:55:24,480

Radcliffe Andre Carson in the media the

1446

00:55:27,589 --> 00:55:26,400

last day or two go and check those out I

1447

00:55:29,450 --> 00:55:27,599

was gonna play them but then I was

1448

00:55:31,069 --> 00:55:29,460

worried about copyrights and all this so

1449

00:55:33,530 --> 00:55:31,079

I just recommend people go and check

1450

00:55:35,569 --> 00:55:33,540

them out for themselves and uh take what

1451

00:55:38,829 --> 00:55:35,579

you will from it because it you know it

1452

00:55:41,589 --> 00:55:38,839

was very interesting uh let's move on to

1453

00:55:44,990 --> 00:55:41,599

Kirkpatrick's slideshow

1454

00:55:48,290 --> 00:55:45,000

uh here we go

1455

00:55:51,230 --> 00:55:48,300

uh and this was a lot better I can't

1456

00:55:52,849 --> 00:55:51,240

remember if anyone can who he presented

1457

00:55:54,049 --> 00:55:52,859

it to I did have it written down and I

1458

00:55:55,030 --> 00:55:54,059

can't remember where I wrote it down it

1459

00:55:58,790 --> 00:55:55,040

was yeah

1460

00:56:01,730 --> 00:55:58,800

yeah and it's an aviation as well was it

1461

00:56:06,049 --> 00:56:01,740

a civil aviation group maybe right so

1462

00:56:11,809 --> 00:56:09,170

I guess it really lays out Arrow

1463

00:56:14,150 --> 00:56:11,819

maybe in an easier to understand uh

1464

00:56:17,390 --> 00:56:14,160

terminology compared to the uh mishmash

1465

00:56:19,549 --> 00:56:17,400

of the UAP report so um

1466

00:56:21,410 --> 00:56:19,559

yeah you guys feel free if there's

1467

00:56:23,450 --> 00:56:21,420

anything that jumps out to you I did

1468

00:56:26,030 --> 00:56:23,460

like on this that it really clearly did

1469

00:56:29,270 --> 00:56:26,040

say anomalous spaceborne Airborne

1470

00:56:31,490 --> 00:56:29,280

Seaborn or trans medium like just right

1471

00:56:34,010 --> 00:56:31,500

in your face was just brilliant on the

1472

00:56:36,950 --> 00:56:34,020

get-go I think Chris mellon's really

1473

00:56:38,870 --> 00:56:36,960

excited he finally saw spaceborne yeah

1474

00:56:41,089 --> 00:56:38,880

he's been really favoring that for a

1475

00:56:42,710 --> 00:56:41,099

while now so it's nice to see

1476

00:56:44,390 --> 00:56:42,720

um and then also it you know going on to

1477

00:56:47,390 --> 00:56:44,400

say that something is not attributable

1478

00:56:50,270 --> 00:56:47,400

at attribute attributable to known

1479

00:56:52,069 --> 00:56:50,280

actors or causes so you know really

1480

00:56:54,650 --> 00:56:52,079

laying out that this is for genuine

1481

00:56:57,170 --> 00:56:54,660

unidentified anomalous objects so

1482

00:56:59,390 --> 00:56:57,180

yeah that's great

1483

00:57:01,130 --> 00:56:59,400

um and it says here complex hazards and

1484

00:57:02,809 --> 00:57:01,140

threats across service Regional and

1485

00:57:05,569 --> 00:57:02,819

domain boundaries

1486

00:57:06,950 --> 00:57:05,579

yeah very interesting language

1487

00:57:11,750 --> 00:57:06,960

uh

1488

00:57:13,790 --> 00:57:11,760

there's anything you really want to sort

1489

00:57:15,290 --> 00:57:13,800

of pick out please I might miss it so go

1490

00:57:16,549 --> 00:57:15,300

ahead

1491

00:57:18,890 --> 00:57:16,559

um

1492

00:57:21,170 --> 00:57:18,900

talking about characteristics behavioral

1493

00:57:25,250 --> 00:57:21,180

technical physical

1494

00:57:29,569 --> 00:57:26,630

I don't know what they mean by the

1495

00:57:31,250 --> 00:57:29,579

disposition that's observed phenomena I

1496

00:57:33,170 --> 00:57:31,260

mean do they mean characteristics I mean

1497

00:57:34,130 --> 00:57:33,180

because that's that's not what they oh

1498

00:57:36,049 --> 00:57:34,140

no that's not what they mean because

1499

00:57:37,190 --> 00:57:36,059

that's a separate bullet point in the

1500

00:57:38,630 --> 00:57:37,200

very beginning so I want to know what

1501

00:57:40,250 --> 00:57:38,640

the disposition is

1502

00:57:41,150 --> 00:57:40,260

but it's nice in the vision to see that

1503

00:57:42,770 --> 00:57:41,160

they're talking about greater

1504

00:57:44,890 --> 00:57:42,780

transparency now does that mean greater

1505

00:57:49,450 --> 00:57:44,900

transparency within the IC and the dod

1506

00:57:52,010 --> 00:57:49,460

or outside into public

1507

00:57:55,430 --> 00:57:52,020

I think that's keeping it internal still

1508

00:57:59,589 --> 00:57:58,010

yeah yeah absolutely

1509

00:58:05,270 --> 00:57:59,599

um

1510

00:58:06,710 --> 00:58:05,280

got given the slides from

1511

00:58:09,410 --> 00:58:06,720

Sue as well

1512

00:58:12,049 --> 00:58:09,420

[Music]

1513

00:58:16,150 --> 00:58:12,059

yeah I mean

1514

00:58:19,370 --> 00:58:16,160

any assess technological gap between the

1515

00:58:21,589 --> 00:58:19,380

phenomena and the United States on page

1516

00:58:23,450 --> 00:58:21,599

three

1517

00:58:25,670 --> 00:58:23,460

um in terms of vulnerabilities that's

1518

00:58:27,109 --> 00:58:25,680

really important and it was quite

1519

00:58:28,790 --> 00:58:27,119

interesting because Radcliffe when he

1520

00:58:30,349 --> 00:58:28,800

was speaking today was saying that this

1521

00:58:33,109 --> 00:58:30,359

is technology that we don't possess we

1522

00:58:34,910 --> 00:58:33,119

need to know that and he was questioning

1523

00:58:36,770 --> 00:58:34,920

that the term foreign as well whether

1524

00:58:38,450 --> 00:58:36,780

that be a government or something else

1525

00:58:40,490 --> 00:58:38,460

it was like okay what do we mean by the

1526

00:58:42,109 --> 00:58:40,500

definition of foreign now although I'd

1527

00:58:44,569 --> 00:58:42,119

say in the report it's made quite clear

1528

00:58:46,789 --> 00:58:44,579

that it's foreign government but um it's

1529

00:58:48,970 --> 00:58:46,799

another term to look out for in terms of

1530

00:58:53,289 --> 00:58:48,980

them trying all right technology

1531

00:58:55,370 --> 00:58:53,299

Florida it could be a synonym for aliens

1532

00:58:56,809 --> 00:58:55,380

I thought this line was interesting

1533

00:58:58,670 --> 00:58:56,819

where it says threats to the immediate

1534

00:59:01,190 --> 00:58:58,680

safety of U.S citizens and government

1535

00:59:01,970 --> 00:59:01,200

facilities across domains is priority I

1536

00:59:03,530 --> 00:59:01,980

mean

1537

00:59:05,450 --> 00:59:03,540

that's the first time I've ever seen

1538

00:59:06,890 --> 00:59:05,460

them say anything about any kind of

1539

00:59:09,770 --> 00:59:06,900

possible

1540

00:59:12,049 --> 00:59:09,780

threat or lack of safety to General

1541

00:59:14,510 --> 00:59:12,059

citizenship of a country I mean that's

1542

00:59:15,890 --> 00:59:14,520

scary yeah and what's really interesting

1543

00:59:17,569 --> 00:59:15,900

is like coming from a military

1544

00:59:20,450 --> 00:59:17,579

intelligence background if they were

1545

00:59:21,170 --> 00:59:20,460

talking about like military Pilots or

1546

00:59:23,569 --> 00:59:21,180

something like that they would say

1547

00:59:25,730 --> 00:59:23,579

service lovers so the the use of the

1548

00:59:27,410 --> 00:59:25,740

term or Warfighter or something like

1549

00:59:30,589 --> 00:59:27,420

that they use the term citizen is very

1550

00:59:32,329 --> 00:59:30,599

interesting absolutely just address this

1551
00:59:34,330 --> 00:59:32,339
would you mind Chris were these slides

1552
00:59:36,109 --> 00:59:34,340
leaked as a Counterpoint to the report

1553
00:59:39,910 --> 00:59:36,119
[Music]

1554
00:59:42,770 --> 00:59:39,920
so what happened was that he gave it

1555
00:59:46,069 --> 00:59:42,780
Wednesday that he gave the presentation

1556
00:59:48,950 --> 00:59:46,079
and yeah I was trying to get in touch

1557
00:59:51,230 --> 00:59:48,960
with the uh with the organizers to see

1558
00:59:52,849 --> 00:59:51,240
if I could perhaps watch it live and

1559
00:59:54,829 --> 00:59:52,859
then they were basically saying oh we're

1560
00:59:56,089 --> 00:59:54,839
not doing it as a live stream I was like

1561
00:59:58,010 --> 00:59:56,099
okay cool

1562
01:00:00,230 --> 00:59:58,020
um and then I contacted Susan Goff

1563
01:00:01,970 --> 01:00:00,240

slides but I mean Dean Johnson has

1564

01:00:03,829 --> 01:00:01,980

already releasing by the time

1565

01:00:05,870 --> 01:00:03,839

um Susan gave them to me and

1566

01:00:07,789 --> 01:00:05,880

unfortunately they had no transcript for

1567

01:00:09,589 --> 01:00:07,799

this event either which is quite

1568

01:00:11,030 --> 01:00:09,599

disappointing but you know if there's

1569

01:00:13,609 --> 01:00:11,040

anyone out there that was there for this

1570

01:00:15,289 --> 01:00:13,619

event that wants to uh talk to me

1571

01:00:17,569 --> 01:00:15,299

um please come forward and um yeah

1572

01:00:19,069 --> 01:00:17,579

message me up on Twitter yeah just

1573

01:00:22,910 --> 01:00:19,079

confirm it was January the 11th

1574

01:00:25,010 --> 01:00:22,920

Wednesday the 11th uh I believe it was

1575

01:00:27,770 --> 01:00:26,809

yeah Katie there's that line that you

1576

01:00:29,630 --> 01:00:27,780

were talking about earlier the

1577

01:00:31,730 --> 01:00:29,640

consequence of such moderate to high

1578

01:00:33,770 --> 01:00:31,740

potentially leading to adversarial

1579

01:00:35,030 --> 01:00:33,780

misattribution of UAP to the United

1580

01:00:37,069 --> 01:00:35,040

States

1581

01:00:40,030 --> 01:00:37,079

so yeah that's yeah I mean that could

1582

01:00:43,010 --> 01:00:40,040

that could be catastrophic I mean

1583

01:00:44,270 --> 01:00:43,020

we know that the UAP are coming into our

1584

01:00:46,490 --> 01:00:44,280

country and buzzing nuclear

1585

01:00:49,069 --> 01:00:46,500

installations imagine if they think that

1586

01:00:51,289 --> 01:00:49,079

we're doing that in Iran right or or

1587

01:00:53,930 --> 01:00:51,299

something like that that would be very

1588

01:00:56,690 --> 01:00:53,940

volatile and sensitive yeah and then

1589

01:00:59,150 --> 01:00:56,700

that section of the sorry go on sorry

1590

01:01:00,710 --> 01:00:59,160

no no no go for it I just wanted to

1591

01:01:02,089 --> 01:01:00,720

highlight that uh below there in the

1592

01:01:04,309 --> 01:01:02,099

bottom right where it says allies and

1593

01:01:07,250 --> 01:01:04,319

strategic competitors apply resources to

1594

01:01:09,349 --> 01:01:07,260

observe identify and attribute UAP and

1595

01:01:11,210 --> 01:01:09,359

that link there is actually a link to to

1596

01:01:13,730 --> 01:01:11,220

a Chinese site

1597

01:01:16,089 --> 01:01:13,740

so

1598

01:01:20,270 --> 01:01:18,349

it's already thrown up a security

1599

01:01:22,549 --> 01:01:20,280

warning so I'm not going to do it right

1600

01:01:24,289 --> 01:01:22,559

now but that was really that's the only

1601

01:01:27,230 --> 01:01:24,299

Link in the entire

1602

01:01:29,809 --> 01:01:27,240

slideshow that you know external link

1603

01:01:33,549 --> 01:01:29,819

and it's to Chinese yeah it's it's yeah

1604

01:01:36,049 --> 01:01:33,559

makes you ask a lot of questions yeah

1605

01:01:37,730 --> 01:01:36,059

if I was a lobbyist I'd be looking at

1606

01:01:40,670 --> 01:01:37,740

how much money the Chinese are putting

1607

01:01:42,230 --> 01:01:40,680

onto this and I would go to the members

1608

01:01:43,730 --> 01:01:42,240

of Congress and say oh you really want

1609

01:01:44,450 --> 01:01:43,740

to spend less than Chinese or spending

1610

01:01:47,270 --> 01:01:44,460

on this

1611

01:01:49,250 --> 01:01:47,280

that would be my strategy so I I don't

1612

01:01:51,410 --> 01:01:49,260

know if we if we have information on

1613

01:01:53,990 --> 01:01:51,420

what the dollar sign is behind the

1614

01:01:56,690 --> 01:01:54,000

Chinese effort but that's an easy way to

1615

01:01:59,450 --> 01:01:56,700

get uh members of Congress on your side

1616

01:02:01,609 --> 01:01:59,460

yes

1617

01:02:03,589 --> 01:02:01,619

absolutely yeah I think um China calls

1618

01:02:05,390 --> 01:02:03,599

are unidentified is it like air

1619

01:02:07,309 --> 01:02:05,400

conditions

1620

01:02:10,670 --> 01:02:07,319

um yeah unidentified air conditioners

1621

01:02:12,410 --> 01:02:10,680

that's how the Chinese refer to as the

1622

01:02:15,950 --> 01:02:12,420

people's Liberation Army no connection

1623

01:02:18,770 --> 01:02:15,960

to Liberation Times by the way uh

1624

01:02:21,829 --> 01:02:18,780

pretty interesting but I mean I wrote an

1625

01:02:23,450 --> 01:02:21,839

article on Fry on Friday so apparently

1626

01:02:25,849 --> 01:02:23,460

tomorrow the decision is going to be

1627

01:02:26,450 --> 01:02:25,859

made in terms of the

1628

01:02:29,210 --> 01:02:26,460

um

1629

01:02:30,589 --> 01:02:29,220

the the UN decision for San Marino

1630

01:02:33,170 --> 01:02:30,599

whether they press ahead of it which

1631

01:02:36,530 --> 01:02:33,180

should be quite exciting and this whole

1632

01:02:40,030 --> 01:02:36,540

effort can trace its origins in China

1633

01:02:43,309 --> 01:02:40,040

because in 2018 a bunch of like Chinese

1634

01:02:45,349 --> 01:02:43,319

researchers for some reason decided to

1635

01:02:48,770 --> 01:02:45,359

do these huge like

1636

01:02:50,270 --> 01:02:48,780

um symposiums on on UFOs

1637

01:02:51,829 --> 01:02:50,280

um one being held in I think it's

1638

01:02:54,410 --> 01:02:51,839

Chongqing

1639

01:02:56,329 --> 01:02:54,420

um China and the other in Moscow and

1640

01:02:59,150 --> 01:02:56,339

Russia it was kind of like a joint kind

1641

01:02:59,950 --> 01:02:59,160

of like Russian Chinese initiative and I

1642

01:03:02,630 --> 01:02:59,960

mean

1643

01:03:04,190 --> 01:03:02,640

yeah from the footage you can find it

1644

01:03:06,410 --> 01:03:04,200

online I'm hoping it's still there but

1645

01:03:08,150 --> 01:03:06,420

you can see like the one in Moscow and

1646

01:03:11,390 --> 01:03:08,160

you've got a whole bunch of like

1647

01:03:14,150 --> 01:03:11,400

military in there like soldiers

1648

01:03:16,609 --> 01:03:14,160

um their uniforms on and they've got

1649

01:03:18,170 --> 01:03:16,619

um they've got Russian cosmonauts

1650

01:03:20,089 --> 01:03:18,180

present as well and they've got big

1651

01:03:22,130 --> 01:03:20,099

Industries and represent

1652

01:03:24,829 --> 01:03:22,140

you know representatives there from from

1653

01:03:27,010 --> 01:03:24,839

different fate um trade federations and

1654

01:03:30,589 --> 01:03:27,020

stuff and um there's a really big

1655

01:03:32,150 --> 01:03:30,599

well-organized thing and um what they

1656

01:03:33,410 --> 01:03:32,160

did was they got lots of representatives

1657

01:03:36,289 --> 01:03:33,420

from different countries like Gary

1658

01:03:37,970 --> 01:03:36,299

hasseltine from the UK for example I

1659

01:03:41,089 --> 01:03:37,980

think they they bought him over for one

1660

01:03:42,410 --> 01:03:41,099

of the events and the plan was to have a

1661

01:03:45,589 --> 01:03:42,420

third

1662

01:03:48,950 --> 01:03:45,599

um event in heze in China

1663

01:03:50,990 --> 01:03:48,960

um and the plan was at that event to

1664

01:03:52,789 --> 01:03:51,000

actually come up with a plan and

1665

01:03:55,430 --> 01:03:52,799

coordinate going to the United Nations

1666

01:03:57,530 --> 01:03:55,440

to get the sport out of the UN and this

1667

01:03:59,690 --> 01:03:57,540

is crazy because as you would know like

1668

01:04:02,410 --> 01:03:59,700

nothing in China happens if you don't

1669

01:04:04,910 --> 01:04:02,420

have the um

1670

01:04:06,710 --> 01:04:04,920

exactly if if you don't have the

1671

01:04:08,630 --> 01:04:06,720

government saying it's okay then you

1672

01:04:10,789 --> 01:04:08,640

can't do it so I just thought this was

1673

01:04:12,890 --> 01:04:10,799

really interesting and all of a sudden

1674

01:04:15,049 --> 01:04:12,900

this thing just fell away

1675

01:04:18,710 --> 01:04:15,059

um so I think there's a big undercurrent

1676

01:04:20,030 --> 01:04:18,720

of um of interest in China which is yeah

1677

01:04:22,910 --> 01:04:20,040

which may be bigger than some of us May

1678

01:04:25,190 --> 01:04:22,920

me May realize

1679

01:04:27,109 --> 01:04:25,200

well and honestly like I'm I'm shocked

1680

01:04:29,870 --> 01:04:27,119

by that I'm shocked that the Chinese and

1681

01:04:31,190 --> 01:04:29,880

the Russians want to take this to the

1682

01:04:32,690 --> 01:04:31,200

U.N

1683

01:04:35,150 --> 01:04:32,700

um because I know that like in the US

1684

01:04:37,130 --> 01:04:35,160

for example while there may be

1685

01:04:38,450 --> 01:04:37,140

um positives to going to the UN and

1686

01:04:39,950 --> 01:04:38,460

sharing information with our allies and

1687

01:04:42,349 --> 01:04:39,960

whatnot there's going to be a big group

1688

01:04:43,730 --> 01:04:42,359

of people that say no we're not sharing

1689

01:04:45,289 --> 01:04:43,740

any information with anyone we don't

1690

01:04:46,970 --> 01:04:45,299

want to you know that that loses our

1691

01:04:48,109 --> 01:04:46,980

strategic Advantage

1692

01:04:50,030 --> 01:04:48,119

um so

1693

01:04:52,010 --> 01:04:50,040

yeah I'm really interested in what the

1694

01:04:53,930 --> 01:04:52,020

Chinese and Russians think they can gain

1695

01:04:56,990 --> 01:04:53,940

from that you know like what's what's

1696

01:04:58,730 --> 01:04:57,000

their end game is it is it truly just oh

1697

01:05:00,530 --> 01:04:58,740

yeah we want to be partners with

1698

01:05:01,609 --> 01:05:00,540

everyone and get the information I don't

1699

01:05:05,329 --> 01:05:01,619

know

1700

01:05:06,589 --> 01:05:05,339

um but I would be a little skeptical I'm

1701

01:05:07,370 --> 01:05:06,599

always a little skeptical of these

1702

01:05:09,170 --> 01:05:07,380

things

1703

01:05:10,670 --> 01:05:09,180

um but it'll be interesting to see

1704

01:05:12,170 --> 01:05:10,680

that's not to say that I don't think the

1705

01:05:13,549 --> 01:05:12,180

UN initiative is a good idea I think

1706

01:05:15,109 --> 01:05:13,559

it's a great idea

1707

01:05:17,390 --> 01:05:15,119

um but I think everyone's going to come

1708

01:05:19,250 --> 01:05:17,400

to that with different motivations and

1709

01:05:20,089 --> 01:05:19,260

different expectations of what they get

1710

01:05:22,309 --> 01:05:20,099

out of it

1711

01:05:24,829 --> 01:05:22,319

yeah no definitely

1712

01:05:27,289 --> 01:05:24,839

now this page really stood out to me a

1713

01:05:29,270 --> 01:05:27,299

few points in that first box there it's

1714

01:05:31,190 --> 01:05:29,280

talking about capability capabilities

1715

01:05:33,950 --> 01:05:31,200

for optimized cross-functional UAP

1716

01:05:35,329 --> 01:05:33,960

detection tracking mitigation and

1717

01:05:38,569 --> 01:05:35,339

Recovery

1718

01:05:43,910 --> 01:05:38,579

uh so of course that really screamed you

1719

01:05:47,930 --> 01:05:43,920

know recovery of UAP okay okay okay okay

1720

01:05:51,470 --> 01:05:47,940

uh probably done it before

1721

01:05:52,190 --> 01:05:51,480

maybe yeah you never know

1722

01:05:53,870 --> 01:05:52,200

um

1723

01:05:55,910 --> 01:05:53,880

and then this second one revealing and

1724

01:05:58,430 --> 01:05:55,920

exploiting Elusive and enigmatic

1725

01:06:02,030 --> 01:05:58,440

signatures through Advanced Technologies

1726

01:06:06,109 --> 01:06:02,040

which is you know exploiting

1727

01:06:08,750 --> 01:06:06,119

hmm yes that that that's really really

1728

01:06:10,789 --> 01:06:08,760

interesting I mean

1729

01:06:14,450 --> 01:06:10,799

um one of the first articles on

1730

01:06:16,730 --> 01:06:14,460

Liberation times was was done by Bob

1731

01:06:21,049 --> 01:06:16,740

liskin who's the former

1732

01:06:23,950 --> 01:06:21,059

um Marine intelligence officer and that

1733

01:06:27,410 --> 01:06:23,960

was all about signature management

1734

01:06:29,809 --> 01:06:27,420

and uh yeah that that's really really

1735

01:06:31,970 --> 01:06:29,819

interesting it was kind of like um I

1736

01:06:33,349 --> 01:06:31,980

think on the East Coast if you if you

1737

01:06:35,809 --> 01:06:33,359

look at what's out there in terms of

1738

01:06:37,630 --> 01:06:35,819

public information it seemed as though

1739

01:06:39,890 --> 01:06:37,640

that there was a certain degree of

1740

01:06:43,130 --> 01:06:39,900

signature management taking place that

1741

01:06:45,890 --> 01:06:43,140

we couldn't explain

1742

01:06:47,390 --> 01:06:45,900

um so yeah that that's that's really

1743

01:06:49,490 --> 01:06:47,400

really interesting there and if you're

1744

01:06:50,950 --> 01:06:49,500

getting into it from an intelligence

1745

01:06:53,930 --> 01:06:50,960

perspective

1746

01:06:55,670 --> 01:06:53,940

that's one of like the key the key

1747

01:06:57,470 --> 01:06:55,680

things

1748

01:06:59,089 --> 01:06:57,480

um because in the last report it said

1749

01:07:01,670 --> 01:06:59,099

the uaptf

1750

01:07:03,950 --> 01:07:01,680

TF holds a small amount of data that

1751

01:07:06,109 --> 01:07:03,960

appear to share UAP

1752

01:07:08,930 --> 01:07:06,119

um demonstrating

1753

01:07:11,690 --> 01:07:08,940

acceleration or degree of signature

1754

01:07:14,390 --> 01:07:11,700

management so yeah signature management

1755

01:07:16,609 --> 01:07:14,400

is basically used in the military and

1756

01:07:18,770 --> 01:07:16,619

defense context as a signature would be

1757

01:07:21,529 --> 01:07:18,780

any manner of identification that can be

1758

01:07:23,329 --> 01:07:21,539

detected by an adversary so an example

1759

01:07:25,549 --> 01:07:23,339

would be considered a signature for

1760

01:07:27,890 --> 01:07:25,559

example that would be a read or

1761

01:07:30,710 --> 01:07:27,900

cross-section active or passive signal

1762

01:07:33,049 --> 01:07:30,720

submitted infrared emissions or even

1763

01:07:35,329 --> 01:07:33,059

distinctions that can be seen visually

1764

01:07:37,970 --> 01:07:35,339

meaning an identification can be made

1765

01:07:40,609 --> 01:07:37,980

and um by the way those are not my own

1766

01:07:44,690 --> 01:07:40,619

words there's a block I'm not that

1767

01:07:47,089 --> 01:07:44,700

intelligent so no no so that I think

1768

01:07:49,609 --> 01:07:47,099

that's like a really really important

1769

01:07:52,849 --> 01:07:49,619

um thing to kind of like hone in on

1770

01:07:54,230 --> 01:07:52,859

yeah absolutely absolutely

1771

01:07:55,789 --> 01:07:54,240

and then on this next box the

1772

01:07:57,490 --> 01:07:55,799

interdisciplinary analysis you know

1773

01:08:00,470 --> 01:07:57,500

talking about peer-reviewed conclusions

1774

01:08:02,029 --> 01:08:00,480

uh using the scientific and intelligence

1775

01:08:03,589 --> 01:08:02,039

method I mean that's what we always want

1776

01:08:06,230 --> 01:08:03,599

isn't it we want

1777

01:08:08,029 --> 01:08:06,240

peer-reviewed work to be done on this

1778

01:08:11,750 --> 01:08:08,039

subject and you know

1779

01:08:14,990 --> 01:08:13,549

in the US

1780

01:08:18,169 --> 01:08:15,000

Zoom

1781

01:08:20,269 --> 01:08:18,179

to see a legitimate Journal

1782

01:08:22,309 --> 01:08:20,279

you know like let's let's because that's

1783

01:08:23,450 --> 01:08:22,319

how good science is done

1784

01:08:26,209 --> 01:08:23,460

um you know we've talked about this a

1785

01:08:28,729 --> 01:08:26,219

lot uh but we have to be able to

1786

01:08:29,870 --> 01:08:28,739

use our scientific resources in this

1787

01:08:31,910 --> 01:08:29,880

country we have some of the best

1788

01:08:34,309 --> 01:08:31,920

scientists in the world and we're not

1789

01:08:36,470 --> 01:08:34,319

utilizing their expertise because we're

1790

01:08:38,150 --> 01:08:36,480

not allowing this process to actually go

1791

01:08:39,950 --> 01:08:38,160

through peer review which strengthens

1792

01:08:43,249 --> 01:08:39,960

our assessment and our analysis of

1793

01:08:45,289 --> 01:08:43,259

capabilities yeah absolutely

1794

01:08:47,090 --> 01:08:45,299

and in this last box the thing the two

1795

01:08:48,769 --> 01:08:47,100

small parts that stood out to me were

1796

01:08:50,209 --> 01:08:48,779

obviously transparency building trust

1797

01:08:52,430 --> 01:08:50,219

and transparency but the fact that it

1798

01:08:53,689 --> 01:08:52,440

mentions oversight authorities you know

1799

01:08:55,070 --> 01:08:53,699

it's nice to know that they're aware

1800

01:08:56,630 --> 01:08:55,080

that there are people looking over their

1801

01:08:58,849 --> 01:08:56,640

shoulder and breathing down their necks

1802

01:09:00,650 --> 01:08:58,859

you know that that really is important

1803

01:09:03,410 --> 01:09:00,660

so

1804

01:09:06,349 --> 01:09:03,420

yeah what a great page that is

1805

01:09:08,030 --> 01:09:06,359

yeah absolutely

1806

01:09:10,370 --> 01:09:08,040

oh and then this next one is obviously

1807

01:09:11,510 --> 01:09:10,380

talking about educating aviators and and

1808

01:09:13,430 --> 01:09:11,520

Crews

1809

01:09:16,249 --> 01:09:13,440

so the fact that it's talking about

1810

01:09:18,590 --> 01:09:16,259

sharing UAP data you know uh with

1811

01:09:20,269 --> 01:09:18,600

aviators it's like like this is what

1812

01:09:21,470 --> 01:09:20,279

you've got to look out for and showing

1813

01:09:24,229 --> 01:09:21,480

them like

1814

01:09:25,669 --> 01:09:24,239

really interesting stuff like that that

1815

01:09:27,890 --> 01:09:25,679

you know that's kind of what I gleaned

1816

01:09:30,410 --> 01:09:27,900

from that uh just obviously help them

1817

01:09:32,390 --> 01:09:30,420

identify and Report things better uh

1818

01:09:34,010 --> 01:09:32,400

encouraging reporting destigmatizing

1819

01:09:36,650 --> 01:09:34,020

these are all buzzwords that we like to

1820

01:09:38,990 --> 01:09:36,660

hear but I still for some reason a part

1821

01:09:40,970 --> 01:09:39,000

of me is still not convinced over you

1822

01:09:45,050 --> 01:09:40,980

know in the grand scheme of things

1823

01:09:49,669 --> 01:09:47,809

yeah yeah I think there's questions over

1824

01:09:51,050 --> 01:09:49,679

this I mean there's two distinct things

1825

01:09:52,849 --> 01:09:51,060

are happening at the moment obviously

1826

01:09:54,950 --> 01:09:52,859

Kirkpatrick's focusing here in this

1827

01:09:57,110 --> 01:09:54,960

presentation about the active

1828

01:09:59,810 --> 01:09:57,120

investigation

1829

01:10:02,270 --> 01:09:59,820

um which is ongoing in terms of events

1830

01:10:04,550 --> 01:10:02,280

that are being reported but there's a

1831

01:10:06,290 --> 01:10:04,560

there's another stream of things so even

1832

01:10:09,590 --> 01:10:06,300

if you're not

1833

01:10:11,930 --> 01:10:09,600

totally won over by this

1834

01:10:13,390 --> 01:10:11,940

The Whistleblower stuff is going to be

1835

01:10:16,910 --> 01:10:13,400

huge

1836

01:10:19,490 --> 01:10:16,920

I mean you've got Chris Mellon someone

1837

01:10:22,010 --> 01:10:19,500

of his position using those last lines

1838

01:10:24,110 --> 01:10:22,020

when he's talking about his key

1839

01:10:26,930 --> 01:10:24,120

takeaways from this report stating that

1840

01:10:28,790 --> 01:10:26,940

you know he knows the number of um

1841

01:10:30,709 --> 01:10:28,800

you know whistleblowers basically uh

1842

01:10:33,950 --> 01:10:30,719

coming forward that know a lot about the

1843

01:10:36,169 --> 01:10:33,960

crash retrieval programs potentially

1844

01:10:38,390 --> 01:10:36,179

um and reverse engineering programs so

1845

01:10:39,950 --> 01:10:38,400

that that's really really huge so I

1846

01:10:42,110 --> 01:10:39,960

think my key takeaway for anyone who

1847

01:10:44,810 --> 01:10:42,120

feels that look arrows could do anything

1848

01:10:48,709 --> 01:10:44,820

it's going nowhere well first it's been

1849

01:10:49,970 --> 01:10:48,719

taken out of ousdins from asserting a

1850

01:10:53,689 --> 01:10:49,980

step which is great news which is

1851
01:10:58,189 --> 01:10:56,330
um and you know secondly I think we've

1852
01:10:59,689 --> 01:10:58,199
got this other thing which could blow a

1853
01:11:01,070 --> 01:10:59,699
lid on this whole thing in terms of the

1854
01:11:02,750 --> 01:11:01,080
whistleblower stuff

1855
01:11:04,729 --> 01:11:02,760
yeah I mean melon actually used the

1856
01:11:07,550 --> 01:11:04,739
words alien technology I do believe as

1857
01:11:10,689 --> 01:11:07,560
well he did absolutely getting excited

1858
01:11:13,790 --> 01:11:10,699
isn't he he's getting excited yeah

1859
01:11:16,189 --> 01:11:13,800
sorry but he's also he's also very very

1860
01:11:18,410 --> 01:11:16,199
cautious in his writing and he doesn't

1861
01:11:19,970 --> 01:11:18,420
he doesn't throw around a word without

1862
01:11:21,350 --> 01:11:19,980
thinking about it and thinking about the

1863
01:11:24,050 --> 01:11:21,360

ramifications of it so I think that's

1864

01:11:25,970 --> 01:11:24,060

important absolutely yeah he's like

1865

01:11:27,649 --> 01:11:25,980

Chris melon is someone who is he's

1866

01:11:29,149 --> 01:11:27,659

probably written a few of these similar

1867

01:11:31,550 --> 01:11:29,159

reports like this before you know that

1868

01:11:33,050 --> 01:11:31,560

go to like the the top of the top in

1869

01:11:34,370 --> 01:11:33,060

terms of like presidents and stuff like

1870

01:11:36,470 --> 01:11:34,380

that so

1871

01:11:38,930 --> 01:11:36,480

his wording the way that he's been

1872

01:11:40,729 --> 01:11:38,940

trained you have to always take that

1873

01:11:43,250 --> 01:11:40,739

into context and

1874

01:11:46,490 --> 01:11:43,260

um yeah so like Katie said it's hugely

1875

01:11:48,410 --> 01:11:46,500

important the words that he chooses

1876

01:11:50,750 --> 01:11:48,420

yeah absolutely just wanted to highlight

1877

01:11:53,630 --> 01:11:50,760

this comment from JD he says

1878

01:11:55,430 --> 01:11:53,640

the UAP Jia TF was much more informative

1879

01:11:57,350 --> 01:11:55,440

compartment I wonder if Dr Sean

1880

01:12:00,050 --> 01:11:57,360

Kirkpatrick has read into it SEC death

1881

01:12:03,590 --> 01:12:00,060

and communitratcom were

1882

01:12:04,729 --> 01:12:03,600

hmm dot jitatf cropped up I think it was

1883

01:12:07,070 --> 01:12:04,739

towards the end of last year and I can't

1884

01:12:09,350 --> 01:12:07,080

remember where but it's interesting to

1885

01:12:12,470 --> 01:12:09,360

know how much Kirkpatrick has been

1886

01:12:14,270 --> 01:12:12,480

brought up to speed as someone new to

1887

01:12:17,390 --> 01:12:14,280

the study of UAP and running an office

1888

01:12:19,370 --> 01:12:17,400

around UAP what's what historical

1889

01:12:20,570 --> 01:12:19,380

stuff have they shared or maybe more the

1890

01:12:22,669 --> 01:12:20,580

question is what has he actually caught

1891

01:12:24,350 --> 01:12:22,679

up with if he's been handed a whole lot

1892

01:12:27,050 --> 01:12:24,360

of stuff and he's had a limited time to

1893

01:12:31,149 --> 01:12:27,060

look into it I think that's really a

1894

01:12:37,669 --> 01:12:35,450

yes that was like what louisando

1895

01:12:40,790 --> 01:12:37,679

um was quoted as saying

1896

01:12:41,630 --> 01:12:40,800

um in my most recent story

1897

01:12:44,810 --> 01:12:41,640

um

1898

01:12:46,490 --> 01:12:44,820

so it was like now that arrow is no

1899

01:12:49,970 --> 01:12:46,500

longer under the chain of command of my

1900

01:12:52,850 --> 01:12:49,980

old office the ausdi I would support

1901

01:12:55,610 --> 01:12:52,860

increased authorities to Dr Kirkpatrick

1902

01:12:58,430 --> 01:12:55,620

in order to identify all U.S government

1903

01:13:00,709 --> 01:12:58,440

equities both past and present who may

1904

01:13:02,750 --> 01:13:00,719

have been slash are involved in UAP

1905

01:13:05,229 --> 01:13:02,760

studies so yeah you're definitely on the

1906

01:13:07,070 --> 01:13:05,239

right lines there yeah

1907

01:13:09,169 --> 01:13:07,080

I was just going to say he's just

1908

01:13:11,149 --> 01:13:09,179

clarified that the ji ATF was the Navy

1909

01:13:12,590 --> 01:13:11,159

compartment from submarine sensors so

1910

01:13:14,990 --> 01:13:12,600

thank you JD

1911

01:13:18,890 --> 01:13:15,000

sorry yeah I would say that the no no I

1912

01:13:20,750 --> 01:13:18,900

I would say that the 2023 ndaa

1913

01:13:23,689 --> 01:13:20,760

um I believe it was this year that

1914

01:13:27,470 --> 01:13:23,699

assigned the uh Arrow Authority directly

1915

01:13:30,110 --> 01:13:27,480

to dubsec uh depsect def Kathleen Hicks

1916

01:13:31,970 --> 01:13:30,120

I'd say that is very uh indicative of

1917

01:13:33,110 --> 01:13:31,980

the fact that he hopefully is getting

1918

01:13:36,169 --> 01:13:33,120

that

1919

01:13:39,290 --> 01:13:36,179

um Kathleen Hicks is one smart cookie

1920

01:13:42,410 --> 01:13:39,300

and she doesn't take a lot of

1921

01:13:44,330 --> 01:13:42,420

um so you know if there was anyone that

1922

01:13:48,550 --> 01:13:44,340

this office should report to I am

1923

01:13:52,850 --> 01:13:51,290

she's great yeah

1924

01:13:54,709 --> 01:13:52,860

here we go then what kind of information

1925

01:13:57,229 --> 01:13:54,719

would be necessary and sufficient for

1926

01:13:59,270 --> 01:13:57,239

UAP analysis so this is great how it

1927

01:14:00,350 --> 01:13:59,280

breaks down the multi kind of the

1928

01:14:02,689 --> 01:14:00,360

different angles that they can collect

1929

01:14:04,430 --> 01:14:02,699

data to look at and analyze and

1930

01:14:06,950 --> 01:14:04,440

the interesting thing that's in the UAP

1931

01:14:08,330 --> 01:14:06,960

report it did say in one of the parts

1932

01:14:11,090 --> 01:14:08,340

that it seemed that there was not enough

1933

01:14:13,310 --> 01:14:11,100

data or information to do a you know a

1934

01:14:14,750 --> 01:14:13,320

good analysis on it but

1935

01:14:17,330 --> 01:14:14,760

I think

1936

01:14:18,890 --> 01:14:17,340

the the probably is you know they've got

1937

01:14:20,810 --> 01:14:18,900

the witnesses they've got the sensor

1938

01:14:22,850 --> 01:14:20,820

data because census was mentioned so

1939

01:14:24,669 --> 01:14:22,860

many times in that report but it was

1940

01:14:26,750 --> 01:14:24,679

skipped over it was just yeah sentences

1941

01:14:28,970 --> 01:14:26,760

you know I think the fact that they're

1942

01:14:31,130 --> 01:14:28,980

talking about census so much they must

1943

01:14:32,930 --> 01:14:31,140

have so much information but

1944

01:14:35,050 --> 01:14:32,940

this is good and then again about the

1945

01:14:37,370 --> 01:14:35,060

Observer we're talking about uh

1946

01:14:39,110 --> 01:14:37,380

physiological psychological or other

1947

01:14:41,209 --> 01:14:39,120

effects apparently corresponding to the

1948

01:14:43,250 --> 01:14:41,219

UAP observation so they're definitely

1949

01:14:46,130 --> 01:14:43,260

highlighting the health effects here

1950

01:14:49,130 --> 01:14:46,140

there must be something to it you know

1951

01:14:50,570 --> 01:14:49,140

it's not just a what if there's no

1952

01:14:51,890 --> 01:14:50,580

health effects but report all the health

1953

01:14:54,649 --> 01:14:51,900

effects

1954

01:14:58,550 --> 01:14:56,090

he's quite quite interesting because

1955

01:15:00,950 --> 01:14:58,560

you'll remember with the um the the

1956

01:15:03,110 --> 01:15:00,960

Nimitz case Kevin Day basically said

1957

01:15:05,510 --> 01:15:03,120

that they acted as if they wanted

1958

01:15:07,070 --> 01:15:05,520

nothing to do with us

1959

01:15:08,870 --> 01:15:07,080

um and it looks as though like on the

1960

01:15:11,750 --> 01:15:08,880

East Coast as well that

1961

01:15:13,850 --> 01:15:11,760

you know they don't they seem quite

1962

01:15:16,070 --> 01:15:13,860

indifferent these objects

1963

01:15:18,470 --> 01:15:16,080

um although from a sense of uh relating

1964

01:15:19,850 --> 01:15:18,480

to Signature management

1965

01:15:22,010 --> 01:15:19,860

um I think it was Chad Underwood that

1966

01:15:24,229 --> 01:15:22,020

says you can see queues of jamming on

1967

01:15:26,630 --> 01:15:24,239

both your radar and your flare tape

1968

01:15:28,430 --> 01:15:26,640

which is quite interesting as well

1969

01:15:29,990 --> 01:15:28,440

absolutely and I think you know we could

1970

01:15:31,189 --> 01:15:30,000

literally break down this page but we're

1971

01:15:33,649 --> 01:15:31,199

not I'm not going to go to Every point

1972

01:15:35,270 --> 01:15:33,659

but this this UAP Behavior indicating

1973

01:15:38,330 --> 01:15:35,280

whether it is apparent intelligent

1974

01:15:41,149 --> 01:15:38,340

control response to Observation which is

1975

01:15:43,310 --> 01:15:41,159

very interesting uh Observer yeah

1976

01:15:44,930 --> 01:15:43,320

response to observation and or Observer

1977

01:15:47,450 --> 01:15:44,940

presence and apparent indications of

1978

01:15:50,030 --> 01:15:47,460

indifference or hostility I mean yeah

1979

01:15:52,250 --> 01:15:50,040

all of those little points are just so

1980

01:15:55,550 --> 01:15:52,260

valid and so important I mean yeah it's

1981

01:15:58,130 --> 01:15:55,560

just it's such a a rich slideshow and

1982

01:16:00,229 --> 01:15:58,140

again guys the report and this slideshow

1983

01:16:01,850 --> 01:16:00,239

if you haven't got them already the

1984

01:16:04,189 --> 01:16:01,860

links are in the description of this

1985

01:16:06,530 --> 01:16:04,199

video for you yourselves to go and uh

1986

01:16:09,649 --> 01:16:06,540

print out like Katie says read each line

1987

01:16:11,930 --> 01:16:09,659

and peruse and form your own conclusions

1988

01:16:13,850 --> 01:16:11,940

and you know that that's the end of the

1989

01:16:15,950 --> 01:16:13,860

slideshow but you know

1990

01:16:18,830 --> 01:16:15,960

again it's just so interesting that

1991

01:16:21,649 --> 01:16:18,840

there's the two documents are are so

1992

01:16:23,149 --> 01:16:21,659

different in their kind of writing and

1993

01:16:24,530 --> 01:16:23,159

scope

1994

01:16:25,550 --> 01:16:24,540

so yeah

1995

01:16:27,050 --> 01:16:25,560

um

1996

01:16:28,669 --> 01:16:27,060

do you think there's anything we haven't

1997

01:16:30,470 --> 01:16:28,679

touched upon that's worth mentioning

1998

01:16:32,630 --> 01:16:30,480

that's maybe just come out of this week

1999

01:16:33,890 --> 01:16:32,640

anything that's said in the media please

2000

01:16:37,550 --> 01:16:33,900

go for it

2001
01:16:39,590 --> 01:16:37,560
I'm Joey Carson man dropping dropping

2002
01:16:41,330 --> 01:16:39,600
that that word

2003
01:16:44,030 --> 01:16:41,340
um I think it's very interesting that

2004
01:16:46,189 --> 01:16:44,040
we're now talking about debris and you

2005
01:16:49,149 --> 01:16:46,199
said the debris wasn't interesting which

2006
01:16:51,470 --> 01:16:49,159
wasn't notable

2007
01:16:53,689 --> 01:16:51,480
notably alarming so what do you think

2008
01:16:55,430 --> 01:16:53,699
about being used no to be alarming what

2009
01:16:57,169 --> 01:16:55,440
in the world is it then because if it's

2010
01:16:59,510 --> 01:16:57,179
not notably alarming it's probably not

2011
01:17:01,130 --> 01:16:59,520
UAP it means we know what it is right so

2012
01:17:03,890 --> 01:17:01,140
like I have that just doesn't make any

2013
01:17:05,649 --> 01:17:03,900

sense to me and I also want to know who

2014

01:17:08,390 --> 01:17:05,659

cleared him to talk about that because

2015

01:17:10,070 --> 01:17:08,400

that is a huge admission that we have

2016

01:17:11,630 --> 01:17:10,080

some sort of debris

2017

01:17:14,030 --> 01:17:11,640

of something

2018

01:17:16,370 --> 01:17:14,040

yeah absolutely so if you saw something

2019

01:17:18,110 --> 01:17:16,380

that they got from Roswell like decades

2020

01:17:20,930 --> 01:17:18,120

ago it's like oh yeah we pulled this out

2021

01:17:22,729 --> 01:17:20,940

would you be notably alarmed knowing

2022

01:17:24,590 --> 01:17:22,739

that it's been in possession for decades

2023

01:17:26,930 --> 01:17:24,600

but no I wouldn't because it's not going

2024

01:17:29,810 --> 01:17:26,940

to do anything to us I'm not alarmed oh

2025

01:17:31,070 --> 01:17:29,820

my God what's he gonna do it's not two

2026

01:17:32,570 --> 01:17:31,080

senses there isn't there from a

2027

01:17:34,850 --> 01:17:32,580

congressional standpoint in terms of

2028

01:17:37,550 --> 01:17:34,860

you've not told us that's alarming

2029

01:17:41,450 --> 01:17:37,560

you've not told us that he said like

2030

01:17:43,669 --> 01:17:41,460

well you've had it for decades so yeah

2031

01:17:45,229 --> 01:17:43,679

that's that's how I saw it in that way

2032

01:17:46,430 --> 01:17:45,239

it's not that he's not we're not alarmed

2033

01:17:47,750 --> 01:17:46,440

by it because we're not worried about

2034

01:17:50,030 --> 01:17:47,760

what it's going to do or any

2035

01:17:51,770 --> 01:17:50,040

implications from that aspect So and

2036

01:17:54,050 --> 01:17:51,780

I've seen this on social media today

2037

01:17:56,390 --> 01:17:54,060

since posting that video that so many

2038

01:17:59,030 --> 01:17:56,400

people are reading these short quotes

2039

01:18:00,950 --> 01:17:59,040

from these uh important people and

2040

01:18:02,570 --> 01:18:00,960

really coming up with absolute opposites

2041

01:18:04,610 --> 01:18:02,580

depending how you see it and so that's

2042

01:18:06,590 --> 01:18:04,620

funny that Katie and I both just did

2043

01:18:08,870 --> 01:18:06,600

exactly the same thing there and it just

2044

01:18:12,169 --> 01:18:08,880

goes to see that when they're not using

2045

01:18:14,090 --> 01:18:12,179

really defined phrases and words and

2046

01:18:16,189 --> 01:18:14,100

they they are being vague that it can be

2047

01:18:18,590 --> 01:18:16,199

interpreted and this is where we

2048

01:18:21,709 --> 01:18:18,600

the way we end up I suppose

2049

01:18:27,709 --> 01:18:21,719

yeah I mean if I was still in DC

2050

01:18:31,010 --> 01:18:29,090

I'm saying so

2051

01:18:32,630 --> 01:18:31,020

what was that about you know and maybe

2052

01:18:35,090 --> 01:18:32,640

maybe that's what we need we need

2053

01:18:37,070 --> 01:18:35,100

someone to start the phone calls and

2054

01:18:40,010 --> 01:18:37,080

just ask for clarification you know

2055

01:18:42,709 --> 01:18:40,020

pepper them every day with tens of phone

2056

01:18:44,209 --> 01:18:42,719

calls until they issue a clarification

2057

01:18:46,189 --> 01:18:44,219

because that's a that's a pretty

2058

01:18:48,590 --> 01:18:46,199

remarkable thing to say whether you're

2059

01:18:50,270 --> 01:18:48,600

claiming it was notable or not

2060

01:18:51,830 --> 01:18:50,280

um I'm gonna do that right now I'm

2061

01:18:54,169 --> 01:18:51,840

getting in touch with his prep person

2062

01:18:56,030 --> 01:18:54,179

and ask him to Define no to be alarming

2063

01:18:57,770 --> 01:18:56,040

but from you know I'll do the same thing

2064

01:18:59,149 --> 01:18:57,780

I'll do the same thing I'll get off and

2065

01:19:00,770 --> 01:18:59,159

I'm going to call his office and say I

2066

01:19:01,870 --> 01:19:00,780

would like an explanation of what debris

2067

01:19:04,310 --> 01:19:01,880

you mean

2068

01:19:06,050 --> 01:19:04,320

amazing amazing but this is the thing

2069

01:19:08,689 --> 01:19:06,060

you know these people are put onto these

2070

01:19:11,149 --> 01:19:08,699

like Fox News CNN and all it'll take is

2071

01:19:13,070 --> 01:19:11,159

one slip up from one of these people and

2072

01:19:16,310 --> 01:19:13,080

like we're we can latch onto something

2073

01:19:18,370 --> 01:19:16,320

really meaty you know so let's hope that

2074

01:19:21,350 --> 01:19:18,380

we get that soon

2075

01:19:22,850 --> 01:19:21,360

Joe Biden accidentally

2076

01:19:24,590 --> 01:19:22,860

um led the charge into making gay

2077

01:19:27,290 --> 01:19:24,600

marriage illegal you know sometimes a

2078

01:19:29,689 --> 01:19:27,300

little slip actually results in policy

2079

01:19:31,550 --> 01:19:29,699

you know it had happened before it can

2080

01:19:34,550 --> 01:19:31,560

happen again so

2081

01:19:36,169 --> 01:19:34,560

yeah let's get that debris info yeah it

2082

01:19:38,149 --> 01:19:36,179

was good to have like

2083

01:19:40,070 --> 01:19:38,159

to a certain extent confirmation let's

2084

01:19:42,169 --> 01:19:40,080

say if it is the case because I've been

2085

01:19:45,530 --> 01:19:42,179

told that you know there's been multiple

2086

01:19:47,209 --> 01:19:45,540

testimonies from people allegedly

2087

01:19:49,130 --> 01:19:47,219

involved with these

2088

01:19:52,010 --> 01:19:49,140

um programs and they have provide

2089

01:19:53,870 --> 01:19:52,020

verifiable information look as I said

2090

01:19:56,209 --> 01:19:53,880

before the the Senate Intel committee

2091

01:19:57,350 --> 01:19:56,219

doesn't wake up one day and said you

2092

01:19:58,610 --> 01:19:57,360

know what I'm going to get my pen right

2093

01:20:01,130 --> 01:19:58,620

here I'm going to start drafting this

2094

01:20:03,350 --> 01:20:01,140

language right UFO whistleblower language

2095

01:20:05,030 --> 01:20:03,360

that doesn't come from nowhere I mean

2096

01:20:06,770 --> 01:20:05,040

they've had had a good reason to do it

2097

01:20:08,450 --> 01:20:06,780

and they have they've been talking to

2098

01:20:11,390 --> 01:20:08,460

these people behind the scenes for a

2099

01:20:13,070 --> 01:20:11,400

long time now and um that's where this

2100

01:20:14,510 --> 01:20:13,080

language has come from and you know what

2101
01:20:15,709 --> 01:20:14,520
only more whistle players have come

2102
01:20:17,870 --> 01:20:15,719
forward and they continue to come

2103
01:20:20,209 --> 01:20:17,880
forward from what I am hearing from

2104
01:20:22,070 --> 01:20:20,219
what's going on behind the scenes and I

2105
01:20:24,830 --> 01:20:22,080
think sooner or later a decision will

2106
01:20:25,790 --> 01:20:24,840
have to be made from Congress if it if

2107
01:20:31,070 --> 01:20:25,800
they are

2108
01:20:33,530 --> 01:20:31,080
is correct

2109
01:20:34,970 --> 01:20:33,540
and they've got all the answers that

2110
01:20:37,970 --> 01:20:34,980
they've asked

2111
01:20:40,669 --> 01:20:37,980
which at what point do they decide okay

2112
01:20:42,229 --> 01:20:40,679
do we go public about this and if you do

2113
01:20:44,810 --> 01:20:42,239

to what extent do we go public about

2114

01:20:47,229 --> 01:20:44,820

this do we go public about these

2115

01:20:50,090 --> 01:20:47,239

programs do we go public about apparent

2116

01:20:51,770 --> 01:20:50,100

non-human intelligence how is all that

2117

01:20:54,530 --> 01:20:51,780

handled

2118

01:20:56,810 --> 01:20:54,540

um they're the big questions aren't they

2119

01:20:58,490 --> 01:20:56,820

that's what needs to be worked out but

2120

01:21:00,410 --> 01:20:58,500

it feels good to be getting there we

2121

01:21:02,270 --> 01:21:00,420

heard Gary Nolan speaking I think

2122

01:21:04,070 --> 01:21:02,280

yesterday or the day before he's aware

2123

01:21:05,810 --> 01:21:04,080

of three people who have already

2124

01:21:07,850 --> 01:21:05,820

testified and these are not people we're

2125

01:21:10,189 --> 01:21:07,860

familiar with in the UFO Community these

2126

01:21:12,350 --> 01:21:10,199

would probably be people associated with

2127

01:21:14,689 --> 01:21:12,360

Legacy programs to some degree so I mean

2128

01:21:17,750 --> 01:21:14,699

that's very encouraging I don't want it

2129

01:21:20,750 --> 01:21:17,760

to be just UFO Talking Heads all the

2130

01:21:22,189 --> 01:21:20,760

time you know that's not what we want so

2131

01:21:26,990 --> 01:21:22,199

yeah

2132

01:21:28,729 --> 01:21:27,000

I think we've covered everything there I

2133

01:21:30,110 --> 01:21:28,739

mean we could really dial delve deeper

2134

01:21:32,510 --> 01:21:30,120

and deeper but you know I think we've

2135

01:21:34,370 --> 01:21:32,520

covered the basics and like Katie has

2136

01:21:35,810 --> 01:21:34,380

said you know go out there read these

2137

01:21:37,669 --> 01:21:35,820

things for yourself make your own

2138

01:21:39,410 --> 01:21:37,679

conclusions draw your own opinions and

2139

01:21:40,610 --> 01:21:39,420

and I think that is definitely best

2140

01:21:42,350 --> 01:21:40,620

because then we can all come together

2141

01:21:44,630 --> 01:21:42,360

and have these conversations online

2142

01:21:46,189 --> 01:21:44,640

about the different thoughts on it and

2143

01:21:48,830 --> 01:21:46,199

putting our heads together may help us

2144

01:21:51,649 --> 01:21:48,840

come to more understandings and things

2145

01:21:52,970 --> 01:21:51,659

maybe not but it can't hurt I just want

2146

01:21:55,010 --> 01:21:52,980

to give a shout out to everyone in the

2147

01:21:56,870 --> 01:21:55,020

live chat uh cake era here with the 20

2148

01:21:58,850 --> 01:21:56,880

pound donation thank you so much I

2149

01:22:00,470 --> 01:21:58,860

really appreciate that

2150

01:22:02,330 --> 01:22:00,480

um I don't you know beg for these things

2151

01:22:04,370 --> 01:22:02,340

uh so I really do appreciate everything

2152

01:22:07,310 --> 01:22:04,380

that you guys donate to the work that I

2153

01:22:10,310 --> 01:22:07,320

do because it all really helps

2154

01:22:12,169 --> 01:22:10,320

um Katie Chris thank you so much um I do

2155

01:22:13,970 --> 01:22:12,179

I suppose I should have to give a good

2156

01:22:17,030 --> 01:22:13,980

shout out to my friend Lou Elizondo

2157

01:22:19,310 --> 01:22:17,040

again for being so um free with his time

2158

01:22:20,870 --> 01:22:19,320

for me to speak about the report and

2159

01:22:22,790 --> 01:22:20,880

yeah guys thank you so much for being

2160

01:22:25,370 --> 01:22:22,800

here I really really do value you your

2161

01:22:27,050 --> 01:22:25,380

input it really does mean the world to

2162

01:22:29,750 --> 01:22:27,060

me as does your friendship so thank you

2163

01:22:32,930 --> 01:22:31,310

so yeah guys everyone in the live chat

2164

01:22:35,630 --> 01:22:32,940

again thank you so much I'm going to be

2165

01:22:37,910 --> 01:22:35,640

back on Wednesday with Tom Reed to talk

2166

01:22:41,209 --> 01:22:37,920

about his uh work in the UFO field his

2167

01:22:42,830 --> 01:22:41,219

sighting and more so yeah come and find

2168

01:22:45,950 --> 01:22:42,840

me on Wednesday hang out in the live